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DEFINING THE REACH OF THE SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT: EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF THE ANTIFRAUD PROVISIONS
W. Barton Patterson*
INTRODUCTION

As cross-border securities transactions become increasingly important
and common in global markets, it is no surprise that questions arise over
which nation's securities laws apply to a given transaction. Hypothetically,
in a given transaction, up to four different nations may assert jurisdiction
2
1
and application of their laws-the nations of the purchaser(s), seller(s),
company, 3 and stock exchange 4-which complicates the issue. 5 The
United States may unquestionably regulate securities transactions occurring
within its own borders, 6 but federal courts differ over when it is appropriate
7
to extend those regulations to largely foreign transactions.
The question of when American securities laws apply extraterritorially
has divided courts and scholars for decades. 8 Recently, in June 2004, the
* J.D. Candidate, 2006, Fordham University School of Law.

1. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 989 (2d Cir. 1975).
2. See id.
3. See, e.g., Cont'l Grain (AustI.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pac. Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 420
(8th Cir. 1979) (finding jurisdiction where both corporate defendants were incorporated in
the United States).
4. See, e.g., Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 595 (3d Cir. 1976) (finding
jurisdiction where securities were traded on an over-the-counter exchange within the United
States); James D. Cox, Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets, 99 Colum. L. Rev.
1200, 1230 (1999) (discussing how this is the approach in most other Western jurisdictions).
5. See Stephen J. Choi, Channeling Competition in the Global Securities Market, 16
Transnat'l Law. 111, 114-15 (2002) (discussing how this leads to uncertainty for
corporations).
6. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 416(1) (1987).
7. See discussion infra Part I.B.1 (describing the tests the courts employ). For the
purposes of this Note, largely foreign transactions are those in which foreign investors have
invested in corporations traded on foreign exchanges, and complain of fraudulent conduct
that took place largely in a foreign country. These investors have been referred to as
"foreign cubed." Stuart M. Grant et al., The Role of ForeignInvestors in Federal Securities
Class Actions, in Securities Litigation & Enforcement Institute 2004, at 91, 96 (PLI
Corporate Law and Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B-1442, 2004).
8. See, e.g., Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 667 (7th Cir. 1998)
(conduct must be substantial and material); Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27,
31 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (all elements of liability must be within the United States for jurisdiction
to be exercised); Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1983) (conduct
must be significant and further the fraudulent scheme); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114
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U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia became the first
court in the Fourth Circuit to confront this issue. 9 In 1999, a British
telecommunications company, Cable & Wireless ("C&W"), made allegedly
false and misleading statements in the sale of a subsidiary to a German
company.' 0 The statements allegedly inflated C&W's earnings. I ' A
Canadian pension fund that had invested in C&W brought a class action in
12
the Eastern District of Virginia on behalf of a class of investors.
Jurisdiction became an issue because a Canadian plaintiff was suing a
British company, traded on the London Stock Exchange, over actions and
statements related to its sale of a British subsidiary to a German company.13
Although the only connection to the United States was a series of alleged
"sham capacity swap transactions," part of which occurred in Virginia, and
which also inflated earnings, the plaintiffs argued that United States
securities laws should apply. 14 C&W countered that any United Statesbased conduct was "minor and insignificant" compared to the vast majority
of the conduct alleged in the complaint.' 5 The district court agreed with the
plaintiff and found subject matter jurisdiction 16 but finally dismissed the
complaint for inadequacy of pleadings under the Securities Exchange Act of
17
1934 ("the Act").
The district court adopted a rule under which conduct in the United States
must be "(1) significant and (2) substantial or material to the larger scheme"
in order to trigger application of the Act. 18 The court believed that this
formula would do justice to the underlying purposes of the Act without
creating an overly broad jurisdictional net. 19 The court labeled this rule the
"middle ground" between the various circuits, 20 although there is

(3d Cir. 1977) (any conduct designed to further a fraudulent scheme will support
jurisdiction); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 992-93 (2d Cir. 1975)
(preparatory activities do not suffice to establish jurisdiction, and conduct within the United
States must directly cause the harm); Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 524 (8th
Cir. 1973) (conduct must be significant); In re Cable & Wireless, PLC, Sec. Litig., 321 F.
Supp. 2d 749, 757-58 (E.D. Va. 2004); see also discussion infra Part I.B.1 (describing the

tests the courts employ).
9. In re Cable & Wireless, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 757-59.

10. Id. at 753-54.
11. Id. at 754.

12. Id. at 755. Although the facts do not resolve whether any of these investors were
American, the court's ruling on subject matter jurisdiction was confined exclusively to
foreign investors. Id. at 757.
13. Id. at 754-55.
14. Id. at 755, 764. Defendants argued that the plaintiff had not shown that there were
any adverse effects on American purchasers or sellers of securities. Id. at 755.
15. ld.
16. Id. at 762.
17. Id. at 766.

18. Id. at 763.
19. Id. at 762-63.
20. Id. at 762.
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considerable disagreement and confusion over how to classify the rules
21
announced by the various circuits.
This Note explains the arguments supporting the many sides of this
debate, as well the problems inherent in each of these positions, and
identifies a more efficient approach that relies on the purposes and
principles underlying these various positions. Part I of this Note examines
the Act and its underlying purposes, the relevant principles of international
assertion of jurisdiction, and the tests the courts use to determine such
jurisdiction. Part II examines the justifications and arguments behind both
assertion and denial of jurisdiction, the problems attendant on the current
approaches, and recommendations by commentators to make global
securities regulation competitive. Part III argues that corporations should
be allowed, with some limitations, to choose for themselves which nation's
securities laws will regulate them.
I. PRINCIPLES AND TESTS

In order to understand the debate regarding the extraterritoriality of the
Act, it is helpful to have some basic knowledge of the Act itself, the
relevant principles of international law and statutory interpretation, and the
circuit split on this issue. Accordingly, Part L.A will discuss the Act, its
underlying purposes, and the lack of congressional guidance as to its
extraterritorial application. Part I.A will then address The Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law ("the Restatement"), which contains
relevant sections describing the United States's authority and ability, under
international law, to regulate international conduct. Lastly, Part I.A
examines a canon of statutory interpretation that, unless Congress explicitly
provides otherwise, a statute is normally presumed to apply only
domestically. Part I.B takes a closer look at the tests that the federal courts
have developed to determine when they may exercise jurisdiction over
foreign securities transactions, and the circuit split regarding one of those
tests. Part I.B then examines the problems attendant on the current
formulations of those tests. One of these problems, the uncertainty
resulting from the lack of a predetermined jurisdiction, is examined more
closely in Part I.B, along with a proposal to eliminate this problem, and the
fears some commentators have expressed regarding that proposal.

21. See infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text (discussing the disagreement between
courts and scholars over how to classify the various rules). For example, Judge Gerald
Bruce Lee described the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits as
comprising the "most restrictive" group, the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits as
comprising the intermediate group, and the Third Circuit as having a liberal standard. In re
Cable & Wireless, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 758. The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, classifies
the D.C. Circuit as the only member of the restrictive group, the Second and Fifth Circuits,
and itself, as constituting the intermediate group, and the Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits as
being the most relaxed group. Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 665-67 (7th
Cir. 1998).
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A. Background and Relevant Principles
1. The Securities Exchange Act of 193422
One purpose of enacting the Act was to prevent misrepresentation and
fraud in the securities industry in order to protect American investors and
the United States securities markets. 23 Because of this purpose, the
antifraud provisions of the Act are among the most important and most
litigated. 24 Among them, section 10(b) is particularly important, especially
in the context of transnational securities transactions. 25 Although nothing
in the statute expressly provides for a private right of action, 26 the federal
27
courts have accepted that such an action is implied.

22. While there are also important antifraud and disclosure provisions in the Securities
Act of 1933, the question of extraterritorial jurisdiction under that Act has largely been
answered by Regulation S. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-.905 (2005).
23. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2000) (stating that securities must be regulated "in order
to protect interstate commerce, the national credit, and the Federal taxing power, to protect
and make more effective the national banking system and Federal Reserve System, and to
insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets in such transactions"); SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) ("[a] fundamental purpose" behind
the securities legislation was to ensure full disclosure); Robinson v. TCIUS W. Cable
Commc'ns Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 906 (5th Cir. 1997) ("What little guidance we can glean from
the securities statutes indicates that they are designed to protect American investors and
markets .... ); Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 416 cmt. a (1987) (stating
that "the principal purpose" of the securities legislation is to protect American investors and
markets); see also Kaveh Kashef, Securities Law: Understanding Foreign Subject Matter
Jurisdiction Under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act of 1934, 8 Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L.
533, 534-35 (2000) (describing the history of and motivations behind the federal securities
laws).
24. See generally William T. Allen & Reinier Kraakman, Commentaries and Cases on
the Law of Business Organization § 14.4.1 (2003).
25. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). Rule lOb-5, promulgated under this section, provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; see also Kun Young Chang, Multinational Enforcement of U.S.
Securities Laws: The Need for the Clear and Restrained Scope of ExtraterritorialSubjectMatter Jurisdiction, 9 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 89, 94 (2003) (describing the relative
importance of the antifraud provisions in foreign transactions).
26. See, e.g., Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (stating
that the express provision for private remedies under certain other sections of the Act does
not indicate that Congress wished to deny such remedies under section 10(b)).
27. See, e.g., id. (holding that a private right of action is implied, given the broad
purposes of the Act). Kardon was the first case to imply a private right of action. Allen &
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The U.S. Supreme Court has traditionally construed section 10(b) rather
broadly to give effect to the remedial purposes behind the Act.2 8 Thus, it is
not surprising that federal courts often give extraterritorial application to the
29
Act, although the statute itself does not provide for this.
While up to four countries may theoretically assert jurisdiction in any
case, 30 Congress has provided no guidance on the subject. 3 1 The statute
neither includes nor excludes suits based upon securities transactions
occurring in foreign jurisdictions, or with foreign companies, exchanges, or
investors. 32 When establishing tests for when American securities laws
may apply to largely foreign securities fraud cases, courts have often
complained of this lack of guidance. 33 Unfortunately, as the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia stated, "[i]f the text of the 1934 Act is
relatively barren, even more so is the legislative history ....

[O]ur inquiry

becomes the dubious but apparently unavoidable task of discerning a purely
hypothetical legislative intent." 34 However, given the complete lack of
statutory provisions granting jurisdiction, even the Second Circuit, often
said to employ a "restrictive" test when determining jurisdiction, 35 has said
that it is "elementary" that American securities laws must apply to many
foreign transactions, even if they are exempt from registration requirements
and do not take place on American exchanges. 36 As securities markets have
become increasingly international due to the phenomenon of globalization,
the free flow of capital across jurisdictional lines in staggering amounts
37
makes the issue more important than ever.
Kraakman, supra note 24, § 14.4.1. But see Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001)
(limiting the implication of private rights of action to statutes under which Congress
intended a private right of action, regardless of whether such an action would otherwise be
compatible with the statute).
28. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967). Some have argued that this broad
reading of the Act, along with its stringent requirements, have placed United States
corporations at a competitive disadvantage. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman,
Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 903, 924 (1998) (noting that this disadvantage stems from having to "comply
with one of the most rigorous and expensive regimes in the world").
29. See, e.g., Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 1995); Grunenthal
GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1983); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1977).
30. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
32. See George K. Chamberlain, Annotation, Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Securities
FraudAction Based on Foreign Transactions, Under Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 56
A.L.R. Fed. 288, 291-92 (1982 & Supp. 2004).
33. See, e.g., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir. 1975) ("We
freely acknowledge that if we were asked to point to language in the statutes, or even in the
legislative history, that compelled these conclusions, we would be unable to respond.").
34. Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
35. See, e.g., In re Cable & Wireless, PLC, Sec. Litig., 321 F. Supp. 2d 749, 758 (E.D.
Va. 2004) (referring to the group containing the Second Circuit as the "most restrictive").
36. Bersch, 519 F.2d at 986.
37. See Chang, supra note 25, at 90; see also Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a
Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 2498, 2502 (1997)
(arguing that resolution of who should regulate international transactions "is of growing
importance for the proper functioning of the global economy").
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2. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
In a securities transaction which is almost completely foreign in nature,
there must be some justification to assert jurisdiction. The Restatement
contains several important provisions in this regard, listing the various
reasons why a nation may regulate extraterritorial conduct in a given
instance. The Restatement is especially important as courts presume that a
statute does not "exceed what is permitted under international law," unless
Congress inserts explicit language to the contrary. 38 Sections 402 and 403
of the Restatement generally describe when assertion of jurisdiction
extraterritorially is allowable and reasonable, while section 416 concerns
39
jurisdiction over securities claims specifically.
Section 402, "Bases of Jurisdiction to Prescribe," is a very general
provision, but one which is particularly relevant to the tests federal courts
have adopted. Subsections (1)(a) 4 0 and (1)(C) 4 1 are by far the most
important in the context of transnational securities litigation. These
sections recognize that a nation may prescribe "conduct that, wholly or in
substantial part, takes place within its territory," and "conduct outside its
territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its
territory." 42 These two justifications of jurisdiction seem to form the core
of the two tests that federal courts have used in determining the
43
extraterritoriality of American securities laws.
Section 416 is entitled "Jurisdiction to Regulate Activities Related to
Securities." 4 4 Subsection (1)45 mainly deals with instances in which
38. Merritt B. Fox, The Political Economy of Statutory Reach: U.S. Disclosure Rules in
a Globalizing Market for Securities, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 696, 722 (1998) (describing various
presumptions used in statutory interpretation that are important to the securities laws).
39. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law §§ 402, 403, 416 (1987).
40. This subsection provides that, subject to qualifications contained in section 403, a
state may prescribe law with respect to "conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes
place within its territory." Id. § 402(l)(a).
41. This subsection provides that, subject to qualifications contained in section 403, a
state may prescribe law with respect to "conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to
have substantial effect within its territory." Id. § 402(1)(c).
42. Id. § 402(l)(a), (c).
43. See infra Part I.B. 1. The "effects" test finds jurisdiction when foreign conduct has
produced substantial domestic effects. See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206-09
(2d Cir. 1968). The "conduct" test finds jurisdiction when domestic conduct has produced
effects in foreign jurisdictions. See Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468
F.2d 1326, 1333-35 (2d Cir. 1972). For an example of a court relying on subsection (1)(c)
when applying the effects test, see Consol. Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252,
262 (2d Cir. 1989).
44. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 416 (1987).
45. This subsection provides:
(1) The United States may generally exercise jurisdiction to prescribe with
respect to
(a) (i) any transaction in securities carried out in the United States to which a
national or resident of the United States is a party, or
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assertion of jurisdiction appears obvious and uncontroversial, such as when
the transaction occurs in the United States (as well as conduct in foreign
countries significantly related to such a transaction whlich has a "substantial
effect in the United States"), or when the transaction occurs elsewhere but
'46
the conduct involved takes place "predominantly in the United States.
47
Subsection (2),
however, allows assertion of jurisdiction in other
instances, if "such exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable in the light of
section 403.''48 In particular, the Restatement is concerned with three
factors: whether the transaction or conduct has (or reasonably could have) a
"substantial effect" on securities markets or investors within the United
States, 4 9 "whether representations are made or negotiations are conducted
in the United States," 50 and whether the parties involved are United States
51
nationals or residents.

(ii) any offer to enter into a securities transaction, made in the United
States by or to a national or resident of the United States;
(b) any transaction in securities
(i) carried out, or intended to be carried out, on an organized securities
market in the United States, or
(ii) carried out, or intended to be carried out, predominantly in the United
States, although not on an organized securities market;
(c) conduct, regardless of where it occurs, significantly related to a transaction
described in Subsection (1)(b), if the conduct has, or is intended to have, a
substantial effect in the United States;
(d) conduct occurring predominantly in the United States that is related to a
transaction in securities, even if the transaction takes place outside the United
States; or
(e) investment advice or solicitation of proxies or of consents with respect to
securities, carried out predominantly in the United States.
Id. § 416(1).
46. Id.
47. This subsection provides:
(2) Whether the United States may exercise jurisdiction to prescribe with
respect to transactions or conduct other than those addressed in Subsection (1)
depends on whether such exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable in the light of §
403, in particular
(a) whether the transaction or conduct has, or can reasonably be expected to
have, a substantial effect on a securities market in the United States for securities
of the same issuer or on holdings in such securities by United States nationals or
residents;
(b) whether representations are made or negotiations are conducted in the
United States;
(c) whether the party sought to be subjected to the jurisdiction of the United
States is a United States national or resident, or the persons sought to be protected
are United States nationals or residents.
Id. § 416(2).
48. Id.; see also infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text (discussing section 403).
49. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 416(2)(a) (1987).
50. Id. § 416(2)(b).
51. Id. § 416(2)(c). For an example of a court relying on section 416 when determining
subject matter jurisdiction under the securities laws, see Europe & Overseas Commodity
Traders, S.A. v. Banque ParibasLondon, 147 F.3d 118, 128 n.12, 129 & n.15 (2d Cir. 1998).
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Section 403, to which section 416(2) refers, is entitled "Limitations on
Jurisdiction to Prescribe." 52 It states that a nation may not exercise
jurisdiction when doing so would be "unreasonable," which is "determined
by evaluating all relevant factors." 53 It lists many such factors, including
"the extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has
substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory," as well as
the importance of regulating the activity compared to the importance
and
54
reasonableness of another jurisdiction applying its own laws.
It is important to remember that these are simply definitions of when
jurisdiction is allowable. It is generally the role of a statute to determine
when jurisdiction shall be exercised; the Restatement just purports to set

52. This section provides:
(1) Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under § 402 is present, a state
may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or activity
having connections with another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is
unreasonable.
(2) Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable is
determined by evaluating all relevant factors, including, where appropriate:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent
to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and
foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity,
between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity
to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the regulation is designed to
protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to
the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and
the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the
regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or
economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
(3) When it would not be unreasonable for each of two states to exercise
jurisdiction over a person or activity, but the prescriptions by the two states are in
conflict, each state has an obligation to evaluate its own as well as the other state's
interest in exercising jurisdiction, in light of all the relevant factors, including
those set out in Subsection
(2); a state should defer to the other state if that state's interest is clearly greater.
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 403 (1987 & Supp. 2004). But see Mark
W. Janis, An Introduction to International Law 337 (4th ed. 2003) (criticizing this section as
"unsupported by precedent").
53. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 403 (1987 & Supp. 2004).
54. Id. § 403(2). For an example of a court relying on section 403 when determining
subject matter jurisdiction under the securities laws, see AVC Nederland B.V. v. Atrium
Investment Partnership,740 F.2d 148, 154-55 (2d Cir. 1984).

2005]

DEFINING THE REACH

limits on jurisdiction granted by such statutes. 5 5 Thus, while these
provisions are certainly helpful in determining when jurisdiction should be
exercised, they hardly make up for congressional silence on the matter.
3. Canon of Interpretation Against Extraterritorial Application
When Congress is silent as to extraterritorial application of a law, under
an accepted canon of statutory interpretation, the law should not be applied
57
extraterritorially. 56 This is "a longstanding principle of American law."
Its classic formulation is "that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary
intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States." 5 8 However, the Supreme Court has held that this canon
of interpretation can be overcome. 59 The two exceptions are where a statute
must be applied extraterritorially in order to effectuate its basic purpose, or
where the foreign conduct "is intended to, and has, significant effects in the
United States." 60 As the Act's language and legislative history are silent as
to extraterritorial application, 6 1 this canon creates a strong presumption that
it should only be applied domestically. However, the courts have often
found this presumption to be overcome, and have developed tests to
determine when the Act should be applied extraterritorially.
B. The "Effects" and "Conduct" Tests in Determining
Subject MatterJurisdiction
This section examines the two tests the federal courts developed to deal
with the question of extraterritorial application of the Act. It first describes
55. See SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 113 & n.12 (3d Cir. 1977) (referring to the
Restatement as setting "permissible limits of an exercise of jurisdiction by this country").
56. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 158-59 (1993) (section 243 of
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 does not apply extraterritorially); EEOC v.
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 246-47 (1991) (employment discrimination laws do not
apply extraterritorially); Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284-85 (1949) (federal
labor laws do not apply extraterritorially).
57. Arabian Am. Oil, 499 U.S. at 248.
58. Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285; see also Fox, supra note 38, at 721-22.
59. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 794-99 (1993) (the Sherman
Antitrust Act, although silent as to extraterritorial jurisdiction, applies extraterritorially);
United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 99 (1922) (a criminal law making it an offense to
present a false claim to the government applies extraterritorially when a crime is committed
on a vessel flying a United States flag, although such extraterritorial jurisdiction is not
provided for); United States v. Corey, 232 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2000) (a criminal
statute expressly applying to "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United
States" applies extraterritorially). But see F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542
U.S. 155 (2004) (holding that while the Sherman Act may be applied extraterritorially, a
federal court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the claims of foreign plaintiffs if
those claims are independent of any effects felt within the United States).
60. Fox, supra note 38, at 722; accord Michael J. Calhoun, Comment, Tension on the
High Seas of Transnational Securities Fraud: Broadening the Scope of United States
Jurisdiction,30 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 679, 688 (1999) (describing how this canon of construction
can be overcome).
61. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
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the tests themselves, as well as the sharp division in the courts as to the
precise nature of the "conduct test."'6 2 This part then discusses the problems
inherent in the nature of these tests. 63 Lastly, this part examines a radically
different proposal,
as well as what may be the biggest challenge to this
64
alternative.
1. The Nature of the Tests
Despite the lack of any statutory language or legislative history
indicating whether the Act applies extraterritorially, 65 federal courts have
applied it to many extraterritorial securities transactions. To determine
when it should so apply, two tests have been fashioned. These are the
"effects test" and the "conduct test." 66
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook was the first case to apply the effects test to
the securities laws. 6 7 The test seeks to determine whether any conduct in a
foreign state has produced a "substantial adverse effect on American
investors or securities markets." 68 It has also been formulated as whether
actions that took place in foreign countries foreseeably and substantially
harmed United States interests. 69 General effects on United States markets
are insufficient; specific investors within the United States must be
harmed. 70 This test seems to be supported by sections 402(1)(c) and
416(2)(a) of the Restatement, which justify a nation's regulation of
"conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial
effect within its territory," and "transaction [s] or conduct [which] has, or
can reasonably be expected to have, a substantial effect on a securities
market in the United States for securities of the same issuer or on holdings
in such securities by United States nationals or residents." 71 However, the

62. See discussion infra Part I.B.1.
63. See discussion infra Part I.B.2.
64. See discussion infra Part I.B.3.

65. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of legislative
history or command).
66. See, e.g., In re Cable & Wireless, PLC, Sec. Litig., 321 F. Supp. 2d 749, 757 (E.D.

Va. 2004) (discussing the basics of these tests).
67. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968).
68. Robinson v. TCI/US W. Cable Commc'ns Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 905 (5th Cir. 1997).
69. Mak v. Wocom Commodities Ltd., 112 F.3d 287, 289 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting
Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L., 730 F.2d 1103, 1108 (7th Cir. 1984)).
70. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 988 (2d Cir. 1975) ("[W]e do not
doubt that the collapse of [the company] after the offering had an unfortunate financial effect
in the United States. Nevertheless we conclude that the generalized effects described by
[expert witnesses] would not be sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction .... "); In re
Cable & Wireless, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 757.

71. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law §§ 402(1)(c), 416(2)(a) (1987); see
also supra notes 42, 49 and accompanying text (discussing these provisions of the
Restatement).
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true scope of the effects test has never been adequately defined, and it has
72
the potential to be extremely broad.
Another Second Circuit case, Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp.
v. Maxwell, established the conduct test under the securities laws. 73 While
the courts are divided over how to define this test, 74 all would recognize
that it seeks to determine "whether the fraudulent conduct that forms the
alleged violation occurred in the United States. '7 5 This is the test used to
determine when jurisdiction may be asserted over claims between foreign
parties, often justified on the grounds that Congress did not intend
corporations to use the United States as a base for fraudulent securities
schemes, even if the victims of these schemes are foreigners. 7 6 The Third
Circuit has found further support for the concept of a conduct test by stating
that the Act seems to be particularly concerned with fraudulent conduct,
"having no requirement that accomplishment of the attempted fraud be a
precondition to statutory liability. '7 7 The Third Circuit interpreted this to
mean that, if conduct in furtherance of the fraud occurs within the borders
of the United States, it does not matter where (or even whether) the fraud is
78
accomplished.
A court will have jurisdiction over a claim if it satisfies either test. 79 The
effects test is easily passed by plaintiffs who are citizens or residents of the
United States, but the conduct test has proven troublesome, unwieldy, and
unpredictable. 80 Federal courts differ over how much the United Statesbased conduct must be causally related to the fraud and to the harm. 8 1 This
difference has led to as many as six various tests 82 (excluding the Fourth
72. See infra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
73. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
74. See, e.g., Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 665-66 (7th Cir. 1998)
(noting that although the courts agree that the Act must be applied extraterritorially in certain
instances, "agreement appears to end at that point"); Cable & Wireless, 321 F. Supp. 2d at
758, 762-63 (discussing the different positions); Calhoun, supra note 60, at 681 (noting this
"sharp disagreement"); Chang, supra note 25, at 96-98 (briefly discussing this split).
75. Robinson v. TCIUS W. Cable Commc'ns Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 905 (5th Cir. 1997).
76. lIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017 (2d Cir. 1975); In re Cable & Wireless,
321 F. Supp. 2d at 757.
77. SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1977).
78. Id.
79. In re Cable & Wireless, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 758-59. At least one court has held that,
if neither test is met in a strict sense, a court may look at both tests, aggregate the factors,
and find jurisdiction. Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 1995). But see
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 989-90 (2d Cir. 1975) (declining to allow
intermixing of the two tests); In re Cable & Wireless, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 764 (ruling that the
unusual facts of Itoba warrant restriction of its holding to extreme cases).
80. See infra notes 81-87 and accompanying text (describing the division and confusion
regarding the conduct test).
81. Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 665 (7th Cir. 1998).
82. See id. at 667 (conduct must be substantial and material); Zoelsch v. Arthur
Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (all elements of liability must be within
the United States); Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1983) (conduct
must be significant and further the fraudulent scheme); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114
(3d Cir. 1977) (only "some" conduct is required); Bersch, 519 F.2d at 992-93 (preparatory

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74

Circuit, as the Court of Appeals there has yet to address the issue), 83 all of
84
which are difficult to define in relation to one another.
Courts and scholars have recognized three general categories in which to
place the various holdings of the circuit courts on the conduct test: the
broad approach, the intermediate (or "balancing" approach), and the
restrictive approach. 85 Unfortunately, they disagree over which court
belongs in which category. 86 The problem is compounded by the fact that
almost every circuit seems to believe it is adopting the Second Circuit's
rule. 87 While it thus appears that any classification of jurisprudence into
categories is misleading, this Note adopts the classifications recognized by
the Eastern District of Virginia in Cable & Wireless88 (as one of the most

recent cases to analyze the jurisprudence), with the reservation that the D.C.
Circuit's standard is more restrictive than either the Second or Fifth's and
89
perhaps belongs in its own category.

activities are insufficient, and conduct must directly cause the harm); Travis v. Anthes
Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 524 (8th Cir. 1973) (conduct must be significant); see also infra
notes 90-99 and accompanying text (discussing these approaches in more detail).
83. See In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 351 F. Supp. 2d 334, 356 (D. Md.
2004); see also supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text (discussing the approach the
district court adopted).
84. See infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text (discussing the problems with trying to
classify the various rules).
85. See, e.g., Kauthar, 149 F.3d at 665-66; In re Cable & Wireless, PLC, Sec. Litig., 321
F. Supp. 2d 749, 758, 762-63 (E.D. Va. 2004); Calhoun, supra note 60, at 681-82.
86. For example, In re Cable & Wireless described the Second, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits
as comprising the "most restrictive" group, the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits as
comprising the intermediate group, and the Third Circuit as having the "most relaxed
standard." 321 F. Supp. 2d at 758. The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, classifies the
D.C. Circuit as the sole member of the most restrictive group, the Second and Fifth Circuits,
as well as itself, as constituting the intermediate, balancing group, and the Third, Eighth, and
Ninth Circuits as being the most liberal group. Kauthar, 149 F.3d at 665-67. Another court
in the Fourth Circuit found just two groups; the Second, Fifth, Seventh and D.C. Circuits
constitute the restrictive group, while the Third, Eighth, and Ninth form the relaxed group.
Royal Ahold, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 358-60.
87. See, e.g., Kauthar, 149 F.3d at 667 ("The Second and Fifth Circuit's iterations of the
test embody a satisfactory balance of these competing considerations."); Robinson v.
TCIIUS W. Cable Commc'ns Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 906 (5th Cir. 1997) ("We adopt the Second
Circuit's test as the better reasoned of the competing positions."); Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 32
("[We] adopt the Second Circuit's approach."); Grunenthal, 712 F.2d at 425-26 (explaining
why the district court misinterpreted the Second Circuit's rule); Kasser, 548 F.2d at 115
(agreeing with the "Second Circuit, a court with especial expertise in matters pertaining to
securities"); Travis, 473 F.2d at 523 (relying heavily on Second Circuit jurisprudence in
making its own ruling).
88. See supra note 86 (explaining the classification used in In re Cable & Wireless).
89. Kauthar, 149 F.3d at 665-66; see also infra notes 95-97 (describing the D.C.
Circuit's rule).
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The more restrictive approach was developed by the Second Circuit, to
which the other circuits often defer in matters of securities litigation. 90 This
approach requires the conduct that occurs in the United States to include
"the perpetration of fraudulent
acts themselves," 9 1 not merely related or
"preparatory" activities. 92 Additionally, the conduct must directly cause the
harm. 93 The Fifth Circuit uses the same test. 94 The D.C. Circuit purports to
do the same, 95 but may also require all elements of liability to be met before
jurisdiction will be exercised. 96 The D.C. Circuit has indicated that it only
begrudgingly exercises any jurisdiction. 97 The Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits, while employing slightly different language, require only some
substantial or significant conduct to occur within the United States. 98 The
Third Circuit will exercise jurisdiction "where at least some activity
designed to further a fraudulent scheme occurs within this country," a very
liberal test. 99

90. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762 (1975) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (referring to the Second Circuit as "the 'Mother Court' in this area of the
law").
91. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1018 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that jurisdiction
may be exercised over foreign plaintiffs' claims against a Bahamian corporation if the
United States was used to manufacture fraudulent security devices for export).
92. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 987 (2d Cir. 1975) (dismissing the
claims of foreign investors in a Canadian corporation).
93. Id. If those who are harmed are Americans living abroad, a less rigorous approach
applies. Id. at 992-93.
94. See Robinson v. TCI/US W. Cable Commc'ns Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 906 (5th Cir.
1997) (holding that the court had jurisdiction over a claim a by minority shareholder in an
English corporation against the controlling group).
95. See Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding
that the court had no jurisdiction over the claims by the West German plaintiffs against an
American accounting firm).
96. See id. at 30-31.
97. See id. at 32.
98. See Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 667 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding
jurisdiction over foreign plaintiffs' securities claims against numerous defendants); Butte
Mining PLC v. Smith, 76 F.3d 287, 291 (9th Cir. 1996) (no jurisdiction over claims against
British company just because its assets are located in the United States); Grunenthal GmbH
v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 426 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding jurisdiction over claims between foreign
plaintiffs and foreign defendants of numerous nationalities); Cont'l Grain (Austl.) Pty. Ltd.
v. Pac. Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 421 (8th Cir. 1979) (finding jurisdiction over claims
that domestic conduct caused harm in Australia); Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d
515, 524 (8th Cir. 1973) (finding jurisdiction over claims by residents of the United States
against a Canadian corporation's tender offer for another Canadian corporation's shares);
Zurich Capital Mkts. Inc. v. Coglianese, 332 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1113 (N.D. I11.
2004)
(finding jurisdiction over claims by investors in a Bahamian corporation against an
accountant).
99. SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1977) (finding that the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") could bring an action against a defendant even though the
only victim of the fraudulent act was a Canadian corporation).
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2. Problems Inherent in the Current Use of the Conduct and Effects Tests
Jurisprudence on the extraterritoriality of federal securities laws has
produced numerous problems. Most of these problems concern the general
exercise of jurisdiction.10 0 Some, however, concern the specific elements
of the two tests. 10 1 The conduct test's primary problem is that "conduct"
itself is often difficult to define in the context of a global financial
community. 102 The Internet further complicates matters; if it is used to
perpetrate securities fraud, then it may be that no acts causing harm have
actually been committed within the United States. 10 3 A problem with the
effects test is that it broadens with every technological advance that makes
United States investors and markets more accessible to the world. 1°4 This
is especially true as the extent and scope of the effects test have never been
05
adequately defined.1
A more general problem is the confusion resulting from the difficulty of
defining the tests, 10 6 the important role of policy and specific facts in many
determinations, 10 7 and the inability to clearly determine which standard
each court applies. 10 8 As one author has written, "[c]onsidering the number
of variables and interpretations involved in determining foreign subject
matter jurisdiction, error by any court is not unfathomable. The conflict
between the circuits and lack of clear statutory language leads to this
problem."' 1 9 The result is that it is extraordinarily difficult for corporations
to be placed on notice of when and how they may be subject to United
States securities laws and regulations. 1 10 Aside from concerns of equity,
this leads to inefficiency:
100. See infra notes 106-20 and accompanying text (describing these problems).
101. See infra notes 102-05 and accompanying text (discussing the nebulous nature of
these tests).
102. Chang, supra note 25, at 109 (citing Choi & Guzman, supra note 28, at 913).
103. Id.; Choi & Guzman, supra note 28, at 915 & n.52; see also Michael A. Collora &
David M. Osborne, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, in Cybercrime and
Corporate
Fraud:
Rights
and
Remedies
(2000),
available
at
http://dwyercollora.conarticle.cfmcmf_id=392.
104. See Chang, supra note 25, at 109-10.
105. See id. at 110; see also Choi & Guzman, supra note 28, at 914-15 (describing how
potentially broad the current tests are).
106. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text (describing this difficulty); see also
discussion supra Part I.B.1 (describing the nature of the tests and the confusion surrounding
them).
107. See infra notes 158-60 and accompanying text (explaining the role of policy in
decisions to exercise jurisdiction, and criticisms of that role).
108. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text (describing the problems with
attempting to classify the various standards).
109. Kashef, supra note 23, at 554.
110. See, e.g., Chang, supra note 25, at 108-09 ("[P]arties involved in transnational
transactions cannot reasonably predict the jurisdictional consequences of their actions.");
Choi, supra note 5, at 115 ("[I]nvestors and issuers face uncertainty as to what regulations
will apply to their transactions."); Louise Corso, Note, Section 10(b) and Transnational
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[T]ransactions involving U.S. investors could trigger U.S. securities rules
even in cases where the issuer involved is already complying with some
other country's regulatory regime.
These U.S. approaches would
accordingly produce undesirable results such as redundant and
unnecessarily costly systems of overlapping regulation,
and would
I
thereby impede the free flow of capital across borders. I

Another problem is that there is no general international agreement on
what constitutes a fraudulent transaction.' 12 Insider trading presents a good
example: "[W]hile some commentators argue for the continued prohibition
of insider trading, the case for prohibition is no longer overwhelming and is
113
at best on a par with the case for deregulating it."
While the United
States and many other countries make insider trading illegal, this is not a
universal rule; in Switzerland such conduct was merely "considered
dishonorable" as late as 1982.114
International conflict over unwanted extraterritorial application of United
States securities laws, while practically nonexistent to date,"15 presents
another potential problem. When exercising jurisdiction over largely
foreign transactions, the United States interferes with the "regulatory
systems of other countries and compel[s] foreign banks and other
institutions to reveal information that is otherwise protected under the laws
of their countries."" 6 Such conflicts, as well as general resentment over
breaches of international comity, may "catalyze international discord and
' 7
injury to U.S. markets. ""
Securities Fraud: A Legislative Proposal to Establish a Standard for Extraterritorial
Subject Matter Jurisdiction,23 Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ. 573, 601 (1989) (noting that
these decisions are "highly discretionary rulings of particular judges"). Corporations are not
the only ones who suffer from this confusion, as judges must also wade through the mire of
jurisprudence, and their uncertainty often leads them to apply the federal securities laws too
broadly. See Chang, supra note 25, at 108-09.
111. Chang, supra note 25, at 102.
112. Id. at 102, 117-18; George C. Nnona, International Insider Trading: Reassessing
the Propriety and Feasibility of the U.S. Regulatory Approach, 27 N.C. J.Int'l L. & Com.
Reg. 185, 214-15 (2001) (criticizing the unilateral approach the United States has taken to
regulate global insider trading, considering that it is not universally condemned); Kellye Y.
Testy, Comity and Cooperation: Securities Regulation in a Global Marketplace, 45 Ala. L.
Rev. 927, 957 (1994) ("[N]ations have often widely divergent views on what constitutes the
entire panoply of actionable securities fraud."). Countries also disagree over what needs to
be disclosed, and in how much detail. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 4, at 1200 (noting the
divergence between the securities laws of different countries).
113. Chang, supra note 25, at 102.
114. Memorandum of Understanding to Establish Mutually Acceptable Means for
Improving International Law Enforcement Cooperation in the Field of Insider Trading, U.S.Switz., Aug. 31, 1982, 22 I.L.M. 1, 2. While more than one hundred countries prohibited
insider trading by the end of 1998, only thirty-eight of them had ever enforced those
prohibitions. Choi, supra note 5, at 116 n.25.
115. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 416 cmt. b (1987).
116. Chang, supra note 25, at 101.
117. Id. at 109. Professor Kun Young Chang argues:
[T]he current U.S. approach to the extraterritoriality of antifraud rules seems to
have failed to adapt to the needs of international commerce and international
harmony. Even though fraud is widely recognized as a tort, most industrialized
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Aside from these concerns, there is also the uncertainty of whether a suit
adjudicated in the United States will even be enforced in foreign
jurisdictions."18 This problem would seem to be heightened where broad
jurisdiction is exercised, as there is less justification for the case to be heard
in an American court in the first place.1 19 Especially where securities laws
differ, a foreign jurisdiction where a majority of the fraudulent conduct
occurred may be more inclined to deny1 20res judicata effect in such a case,
instead applying its own securities laws.
3. Possibility of Several Jurisdictions, an Alternative, and
the "Race to the Bottom"
A basic assumption behind the approach embodied in the conduct and
effects tests is that, while up to four jurisdictions may theoretically litigate a
claim, 12 1 a permanent decision need not be made between them. Instead of
predetermining which forum shall hear any claims arising from a
transaction, the United States may assert jurisdiction in any instance in
which either the conduct or effects tests is satisfied. 122 It does not matter
whether the United States is the nation of the investor(s), corporation,
exchange on which the securities are listed, or simply the location of the
transaction (or some of the conduct related thereto). 123 This lack of a
predetermined jurisdiction generates uncertainty, which is the principal
reason why it is so difficult for corporations and investors to know which
124
securities regime applies to any given transaction.

countries have significant differences in their views of what constitutes fraudulent
transactions and market practices. Moreover, attempts to unilaterally police ever
greater portions of international markets would destroy the good will toward
cooperation as well as respect for the rules, customs, and practices of foreign
markets, which are essential to the growth of an international legal and financial
community.
Id. at 117-18 (citations omitted); see also Choi & Guzman, supra note 28, at 914 (arguing
that countries upon whose jurisdiction the United States infringes may retaliate and impose
regulations on and exercise jurisdiction over United States corporations and investors).
118. See Chang, supra note 25, at 101 ("[E]ven if U.S. regulators are able to obtain
judgments against foreign-based parties, they may run into problems enforcing such
judgments outside the United States."). For an example of defendants arguing this in a case,
see In re Cable & Wireless, PLC, Sec. Litig., 321 F. Supp. 2d 749, 755, 765 (E.D. Va. 2004).
119. See infra notes 179-83 and accompanying text (describing concerns of international
comity).
120. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text (noting the lack of international
consensus on what constitutes securities fraud); cf Choi & Guzman, supra note 28, at 914,
927-28.
121. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text (listing these jurisdictions).
122. See discussion supra Part I.B.1 (describing these tests).
123. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text (noting the possibility of multiple
jurisdictions).
124. See Choi, supra note 5, at 114-15; see also supra notes 109-10 and accompanying
text (discussing generally the difficulties that uncertainty and confusion cause).
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Some commentators have argued that a jurisdiction should be determined
before the transaction even takes place. 125 Under at least one proposal, the
126
jurisdiction may even be determined at the time of the transaction itself.
These approaches would generate varying degrees of competition as nations
27
seek to attract corporations by virtue of their securities laws. 1
Some, however, fear that such competition will lead to a "race to the
bottom."' 28 These commentators believe that, left unrestrained, regulatory
competition will cause nations to draft progressively weaker securities laws
in an attempt to attract corporations, creating a downward spiral. 129 A basic
assumption behind this theory is that corporations, if given a choice, will
always prefer weaker investor protections. 130
However, other
commentators believe that the market will value securities lower when they
are subject to minimal investor protections, so corporations will not select
weak securities regimes. 13 1 Of course, in the wake of the Enron scandals, it
is difficult to argue that corporations should be allowed more choices which
could be abused, especially when the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was designed to
132
combat the possibility of abuse.

II.

JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ASSERTION OR DENIAL OF JURISDICTION, AND
ALTERNATIVES

This part takes a closer examination of the debate regarding the
extraterritoriality of the Act. Part Il.A discusses the arguments that have
been presented supporting the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign
transactions. First, Part II.A presents arguments that courts have the ability
to assert jurisdiction. It then looks at arguments why courts should take
advantage of that ability. 133 Part II.B discusses the opposing arguments. It
first examines the contention by some courts and commentators that federal
courts do not have the power to exercise jurisdiction over foreign securities
transactions. 134 Part II.B.2 presents policy arguments that would oppose
jurisdiction even if the courts could exercise it. Changing focus slightly,
Part II.C examines proposals intended to make global securities regulation
competitive. This is done by predetermining which jurisdiction's laws shall

125. See discussion infra Part ILC (discussing how this would be accomplished).
126. See infra note 228 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility of forum
selection clauses in securities transactions).
127. See discussion infra Part II.C (describing how this competition would result).

128. See infra notes 212-15 and accompanying text (describing the origins of this theory
and its use in the context of global securities regulation).
129. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 28, at 948-49; Roberta Romano, Empowering
Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 Yale L.J. 2359, 2426-27 (1998)

(criticizing the race to the bottom theory).
130. See Fox, supra note 38, at 747.
131. Romano, supra note 129, at 2418.
132. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (to be codified
in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, 29 U.S.C.); see also Choi, supra note 5, at 111-12.
133. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
134. See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
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apply to any claims arising from a securities transaction. 135 These
proposals are designed, in part, to eliminate the uncertainty faced by
corporations over what securities laws they must comply with. 136 Although
addressing the debate over the extraterritorial application of the Act is not
the primary goal of these proposals, they would provide their own solution
137
to that debate.
A. Arguments in Favor of Jurisdiction
1. Arguments that the Courts Have the Power to Assert Jurisdiction
Some courts and scholars have found support for expansive jurisdiction
in the statutes themselves. As Michael J. Calhoun has argued, section 10(b)
of the Act "is broad and is meant to cover all sales and purchases of
securities, regardless of whether the transactions transpire on an organized
United States market or not. Section 10(b) does not exempt fraudulent acts
in the United States simply because their effects are 'exported' to another
country. ' 138 The Third Circuit has found an implication of broad
extraterritorial application in the express application of the Act to "foreign
commerce" and "interstate commerce." 139 Because of this, Calhoun argues,
both the "balancing" and "restrictive" approaches "violate the will of
1 40
Congress."
Supporters of broad jurisdiction have also argued that such jurisdiction is
perfectly acceptable under applicable principles of international law.
According to the Restatement, Congress can regulate activity that occurs
14 1
within the United States, even if its only effect is extraterritorial.
Therefore, federal courts may have the power to apply the Act to foreign
1 42
transactions in which some conduct occurred within the United States.
2. Policy Reasons Why the Courts Should Assert Jurisdiction
Some argue that broad jurisdiction best serves the remedial purposes of
the Act. 14 3 A fundamental purpose behind Congress's passage of the Act
135. See discussion infra Part II.C.
136. See discussion infra Part II.C.
137. See discussion infra Part II.C.
138. Calhoun, supra note 60, at 704 (citations omitted).
139. SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 & n.21 (3d Cir. 1977); see also Cont'l Grain
(Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pac. Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 421 (8th Cir. 1979) (citing Kasser on
this point); Calhoun, supra note 60, at 704-05.
140. Calhoun, supra note 60, at 721.
141. Id. at 720; see discussion supra Part I.A.2 (discussing relevant provisions of the

Restatement).
142. See generally Calhoun, supra note 60, at 720.
143. Id. at 724; see also id. at 719 ("The broader conduct approach ... best complies with
the letter and spirit of the federal securities laws.").
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was to prevent fraud, 144 and as such, the Supreme Court has called for
broad interpretation of the law itself; jurisdiction should not be interpreted
any less liberally. 14 5 Additionally, some have pointed to the Supreme
Court's holding in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc. that "[a]
to
fundamental purpose, common to [the federal securities laws], was.,. 146
achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry."'
The Ninth Circuit even went so far as to state that an important reason to
assert jurisdiction is that this "may encourage Americans-such as lawyers,
accountants and underwriters-involved in transnational securities sales to
behave responsibly and thus may prevent the development of relaxed
standards that could 'spill over into work on American securities
Therefore, 148
asserting jurisdiction indirectly protects
transactions."' ' 147
American investors and markets.
The classic argument for extension of jurisdiction is that Congress would
not have intended fraudulent activity within the United States to go
unpunished. 149 The Third Circuit voiced the fear that a more restrictive test
would "immunize, for strictly jurisdictional reasons, defendants who
unleash from this country a pervasive scheme to defraud a foreign
corporation."' 150 This would encourage corporations to defraud, creating15a1
"'Barbary Coast,' as it were, harboring international securities 'pirates."'
This concern has been heightened by globalization as investments become
Advances
in
increasingly
unaware of national borders. 152
across
markets
and
investors
telecommunications have made both financial
1 53
the world more accessible to corporations.

144. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text (describing the important role of fraud
in the Act).
145. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (holding that the Act, as
"remedial legislation should be construed broadly to effectuate its purposes"); Calhoun,
supra note 60, at 719 (discussing the broader approaches formulated by the Third, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits); see also supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text (describing the broad
scope and remedial purposes of the Act).
146. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963); Grunenthal
GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting Capital Gains); see also SEC v.
Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 1977) (stating that "the antifraud provisions of the 1933
and 1934 Acts were designed to insure high standards of conduct in securities transactions");
Calhoun, supra note 60, at 706-07 (Congress passed the Act to "encourage high ethical
standards of conduct in securities transactions").
147. Grunenthal,712 F.2d at 425 (quoting Note, American Adjudication of Transnational
Sec. Fraud,89 Harv. L. Rev. 553, 571 (1976)).
148. See id. at 424-25.
149. See, e.g., IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017-18 (2d Cir. 1975) ("We do not
think Congress intended to allow the United States to be used as a base for manufacturing
fraudulent security devices for export, even when these are peddled only to foreigners.").
This passage is often quoted. See, e.g., Cont'l Grain (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pac. Oilseeds, Inc.,
592 F.2d 409, 420 (8th Cir. 1979); Kasser, 548 F.2d at 114; Tri Star Farms Ltd. v. Marconi,
PLC, 225 F. Supp. 2d 567, 574 (W.D. Pa. 2002); Calhoun, supra note 60, at 704 & n.178.
150. Kasser, 548 F.2d at 114.
151. Id. at 116.
152. Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659,667 (7th Cir. 1998).
153. Calhoun, supra note 60, at 722.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74

Some supporters of broad jurisdiction argue that extending jurisdiction
154
It
has positive, reciprocal effects for Americans in foreign courts.
"prevents the likelihood" that such courts would refuse to act when conduct
within their jurisdictions has defrauded American investors. 155 If federal
courts do not exercise jurisdiction in such cases, then "[s]ome countries
might decline to act against individuals and corporations seeking to
transport securities frauds to the United States.... [This] would enable
1 56
defrauders beyond the reach of our courts to escape with impunity."
Again, then, exercise of jurisdiction would indirectly benefit American
157
investors.
The liberal exercise of jurisdiction in any given case is often based
largely on general policy reasons. 15 8 The court in Kauthar SDN BHD v.
Sternberg seemed surprised that "some courts have admitted candidly that,
in fashioning an approach to the issue of extraterritorial application of the
securities laws, policy considerations and the courts' best judgment" played
key roles in determining how far the federal securities laws reach. 159 One
court has even stated that, in lieu of adopting a test, "the question may
simply be whether, on policy grounds, we should apply the securities
160
legislation."'
B. Arguments in Favorof Denying Jurisdiction
This section examines the converse of the assertions presented in Part
II.A. This section first discusses the arguments why federal courts do not
possess the power to assert jurisdiction over most foreign securities
transactions. 16 1 It then presents the arguments why, even if courts were

154. Kasser, 548 F.2d at 116.
155. Calhoun, supra note 60, at 704; see also id. at 706 ("[R]efusing jurisdiction raises
the risk that other nations might refuse to enforce their securities laws when conduct in those
countries leads to detrimental effects in the United States.").
156. Kasser, 548 F.2d at 116; accord Cont'l Grain (Austi.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pac. Oilseeds,
Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 421 (8th Cir. 1979).
157. Kasser, 548 F.2d at 116.
158. See, e.g., Cont'l Grain, 592 F.2d at 416 (recognizing that its holding "in favor of
finding subject matter jurisdiction is largely based upon policy considerations"); id. at 421
("We frankly admit that the finding of subject matter jurisdiction in the present case is
largely a policy decision."); Kasser, 548 F.2d at 116 (stating that "it should be recognized
that this case in a large measure calls for a policy decision").
159. Kauthr SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 664 (7th Cir. 1998).
160. Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 595 (3d Cir. 1976). This view has been
criticized by other courts, as many decisions "are based more on policy considerations than
on the language of the securities statutes or the Supreme Court's teachings on
extraterritoriality." Robinson v. TCI/US W. Cable Commc'ns Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 906 (5th
Cir. 1997); accord Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32-33 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
Policy should not enable a court to exercise jurisdiction where it is allowed neither by
statutory language nor canons of construction. See Robinson, 117 F.3d at 906.
161. See discussion infra Part II.B.I.
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able to assert such jurisdiction, they should decline to do so for policy
reasons. 162

1. Arguments that the Courts Do Not Have the Power to Assert Jurisdiction
Opponents of broad jurisdiction, much like its supporters, often draw
support from the language of the Act itself. Section 30(b) is sometimes said
to support limited jurisdiction.1 63 Although that section applies only to
those who transact a business in securities, the D.C. Circuit has stated that it
"rather clearly implies that Congress was concerned with extraterritorial
transactions only if they were part of a plan to harm American investors or
markets."' 164 Citing section 30(b), the Ninth Circuit has held that the Act,
and the Securities Act of 1933, "are designed to protect American investors
and markets, as opposed to the victims of any fraud that somehow touches
165
the United States."'
Courts and commentators have also argued against construing the
applicable sections of the Restatement as granting courts broad authority to
apply the Act to foreign transactions. 16 6 As one court stated, "it would
be... erroneous to assume that the legislature always means to go to the
full extent permitted."1 6 7 The Restatement just sets the "permissible limits
of an exercise of jurisdiction by this country."' 168 A statute does not always
extend to these limits; congressional intent, not the Restatement, controls a
169
court's jurisdiction under a statute.
Supporters of restrictive jurisdiction also point to the canon of
construction that a statute, unless Congress explicitly indicates otherwise, is
presumed not to apply extraterritorially. 170 This canon stems from the

162. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.

163. This section provides:
The provisions of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall not
apply to any person insofar as he transacts a business in securities without the
jurisdiction of the United States, unless he transacts such business in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate to prevent the evasion of this chapter.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (2000).
164. Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 30, 31-32.

165. Robinson, 117 F.3d at 906; see also supra note 163 (providing the text of this
section).
166. See discussion supra Part l.A.2.

167. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir.
1972); accord Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir. 1975); see also
Calhoun, supra note 60, at 696 ("A court cannot assume, however, that Congress always
intends laws to be applicable to the fullest extent allowed by the Constitution.").
168. SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 113 n.12 (3d Cir. 1977).
169. See Bersch, 519 F.2d at 985; Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1334.
170. See SEC v. Banner Fund Int'l, 211 F.3d 602, 608 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Eur. & Overseas
Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas London, 147 F.3d 118, 131 (2d Cir. 1998);
Robinson, 117 F.3d at 906; Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 31 (D.C. Cir.
1987); Fox, supra note 38, at 721-22; see also discussion supra Part I.A.3 (discussing this
canon).
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assumption that Congress is principally concerned with domestic affairs. 17 1
The fact that federal courts, by nature, have limited jurisdiction bolsters this
argument, as even in domestic affairs, federal courts
lack jurisdiction unless
172
the Constitution or a statute provides otherwise.
As Congress has not granted federal courts subject matter jurisdiction
over foreign securities transactions, for the courts to grant it to themselves
is highly improper. While the D.C. Circuit, like courts that have adopted
more liberal tests, was wary of allowing fraudulent activities to go
unpunished, and indicated that perhaps Congress should address this issue,
it was even more wary of courts taking it upon themselves to "amend" the
Act. 173 The court in Robinson stated that "[t]o broaden our jurisdiction
beyond the minimum necessary to achieve these goals seems unwarranted
in the absence of an express legislative command." 174 Extension of
jurisdiction in the absence of Congressional direction is seen as "improper
' 175
judicial activism.
2. Policy Reasons why the Courts Should Not Assert Jurisdiction
Such judicial activism is often said to intrude on the functions of
Congress. As the Supreme Court has stated, "[t]he responsibilities for
assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle
between competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones: 'Our
Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political branches."'' 176 While
some courts and commentators consider such activism problematic in any
context, opponents of broad jurisdiction view the dangers to be greater
when federal courts enter the international community. 177 This alarm exists
because ruling on largely foreign matters should take into account
considerations of diplomacy and international comity, which the judicial
17 8
branch is ill equipped to do.
171. See, e.g., Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) (referring to the
intention to regulate only domestic affairs as "the normal one"); Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 31; see
also Robinson, 117 F.3d at 906.

172. See Robinson, 117 F.3d at 906.
173. Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 33; see also Robinson, 117 F.3d at 906-07 (applauding this
language in Zoelsch).
174. Robinson, 117 F.3d at 906.
175. Kashef, supra note 23, at 555.
176. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984)
(quoting Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978)); see also Calhoun, supra note
60, at 700 (stating that "policy decisions are the proper domain of the legislative branch, not
the judicial branch").
177. See Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 33.

178. Id.; see also id. at 33 n.3 (stating that "foreign policy concerns" should not be left to
"the court's untutored evaluation"); Chang, supra note 25, at 118-20; Testy, supra note 112,
at 929 (arguing that courts are not prepared to analyze the necessary political and market
concerns involved in foreign securities transaction cases); id. at 958 (stating that overburdened dockets, limited access to complex market information, and the judicial bias
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Courts and commentators also cite principles of international comity to
support a narrow test. International comity has been defined in many ways,
but simply stated, it is the practice of courtesy and goodwill that nations
show to each other, although perhaps not as discretionary as such a
definition would imply. 179 It "discourage[s] the application of one nation's
laws if they conflict with the laws of another nation and have an adverse
effect on the other nation's ability to enforce its own laws." 180 The
Supreme Court has cited principles of international comity in discouraging
the extension of the laws of the United States to foreign parties engaged in
foreign commerce. 181 Thus, if another nation has a stronger interest in
adjudicating a securities suit, or in applying its own law, then principles of
international comity dictate that American jurisdiction should not be
exercised, in order to avoid infringing on that nation's jurisdiction. 182 More
lenient tests, such as a balancing approach, violate these principles, "for in
practice they tend to deemphasize foreign sovereign interests and almost
never lead a court to decline jurisdiction."' 183 Thus, a restrictive test better
184
guards the interests of the other nations interested in a suit.
Judicial economy also plays a role in supporting limited jurisdiction.
Courts often point out limited judicial resources and overcrowded dockets
as reasons for denying jurisdiction. 185 Courts need to be "concerned to
preserve American judicial resources for the adjudication of domestic
disputes and the enforcement of domestic law."' 86 As the Second Circuit
stated, "[w]hen... a court is confronted with transactions that on any view
are predominantly foreign, it must seek to determine whether Congress

toward investor protection leave "courts ill-equipped to resolve the overlapping legal,
economic, and political concerns involved in transnational securities transactions."); cf In re
Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1148 (N.D. Ill. 1979) ("[Tlhe judiciary has
little expertise, or perhaps even authority, to evaluate the economic and social policies of a
foreign country .... ).
179. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895) (stating comity is "neither a
matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the
other," but instead something in between); Calhoun, supra note 60, at 688. Black's Law
Dictionary defines "comity" as "[a] practice among political entities (as nations, states, or
courts of different jurisdictions), involving esp. mutual recognition of legislative, executive,
and judicial acts." Black's Law Dictionary 284 (8th ed. 2004).
180. Calhoun, supra note 60, at 688.
181. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 255 (1991) (holding that
employment discrimination laws do not apply extraterritorially).
182. Calhoun, supra note 60, at 699.
183. Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also
Chang, supra note 25, at 100-01 ("[T]he extraterritorial application of U.S. securities laws
may give rise to a breach of international comity as well as cause frequent conflicts with the
sovereignty of other countries." (citations omitted)); id. at 101 n.56 (stating that "every
assertion of U.S. jurisdiction abroad encroaches upon the sovereignty of another national
government").
184. See Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 32 n.2.
185. See, e.g., id. at 32.
186. Id. The Zoelsch court further stated that "[i]t is far from clear that these resources
would be well spent on all the potential disputes in which domestic conduct makes a
relatively small contribution to securities fraud that occurs elsewhere." Id.
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would have wished the precious resources of United States courts and law
enforcement agencies to be devoted to them rather than leave the problem
to foreign countries."' 187 Thus, the interests of the United States in the case
must be weighed before expending judicial resources to adjudicate foreign
claims.188
Some courts and commentators also tout a restrictive test1 8 9 as decreasing
litigation costs for parties. When tests are too fact specific (such as the
intermediate approach) 190 or based largely on policy arguments (such as the
liberal approach),1 9 1 the difficulty and unpredictable nature of the tests
simply increase the amount of time and money spent on litigation.1 92 This

creates incentives for increased litigation on jurisdiction, worsening the
problem of limited judicial resources. 193 Even opponents of a restrictive
approach acknowledge that "it avoids creating numerous cumbersome
195
jurisdictional tests," 194 as it "provide[s] a clear standard."'

An argument used less often is that the more liberal tests may discourage
foreigners from even transacting business within the United States. 196 Not
only would foreigners not be on notice as to when stringent federal
securities laws may apply, but broad jurisdictional tests may deter some
corporations from conducting any business in America, whether fraudulent
197
or not, for fear of the application of strict United States securities laws;
the resulting disparity in the stringency of regulatory requirements would
leave American corporations at a competitive disadvantage.' 9 8 The fact
that some foreign companies removed themselves from American

187. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir. 1975); see also Calhoun,
supra note 60, at 699 (stating that "courts should be leery of allowing the litigation,
especially when the conduct occurring in the United States does not significantly contribute
to securities fraud occurring beyond United States borders"). Supporters of more expansive
jurisdiction criticize this argument. They contend that the fact that judicial resources are
"precious" should not bar legitimate claims. Id. at 724. The argument for limited jurisdiction
is said to be based "on a confusing mix of procedural and substantive law under the auspices
of judicial economy." Id. at 720.
188. See Calhoun, supra note 60, at 719-20.
189. See supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
192. See Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32 n.2. (D.C. Cir. 1987).
193. Id.
194. Calhoun, supra note 60, at 700.
195. Id. at 723.
196. See id. at 719-20.
197. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Globalizationof Corporateand Securities Law: An
Introduction to a Symposium, and an Essay on the Need for a Little Humility When
Exporting One's Corporate Law, 16 Transnat'l Law. 1, 8 (2002) (stating that until recently
the United States securities laws were "held up as probably the most demanding in the
world").
198. Testy, supra note 112, at 935; see also Calhoun, supra note 60, at 720; cf Corso,
supra note 110, at 601 (noting that the unpredictability of the tests themselves could also
deter foreign corporations from conducting business in the United States).
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exchanges after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act to escape its strict
99
provisions lends some support to this theory.'
C. Proposalsto Make Securities Regulation Regimes Competitive
This section discusses a possible solution to the jurisdictional question by
determining which securities laws should apply to a transaction in advance.
It first describes proposals to make such application dependent on
territoriality, either of the exchange or of the corporation. 2 00 This section
then presents existing proposals to allow corporations to choose their own
securities regime free from territorial concerns, which may be termed "free
market approaches." 20 1 This section concludes by discussing some
criticisms of these free-market approaches.
1. Territorial-Market Approaches
A solution to the jurisdictional problem can be found in a larger debate
among commentators over which nation's securities laws should govern a
corporation. 20 2 Under these commentators' proposals, even if a United
States court were to assert jurisdiction, it may have to apply the securities
laws of another nation. This framework would create "multiple disclosure
standards" within the United States. 20 3 Some have argued for various
solutions- which, while
different, have been collectively referred to as
"market approaches." 20 4 One such approach is the established practice in
most other Western countries, which apply the disclosure laws of the nation
of the exchange on which the securities are listed; at least one scholar has
argued that the United States should adopt a similar system. 20 5 This
method, along with one advocated by Professor Merritt Fox, may be termed
"territorial" market approaches.
Professor Fox argues that the disclosure laws of a corporation's actual
domicile should control, no matter where the securities transaction takes
place. 20 6 He terms this "the issuer-nationality approach. '20 7 This would
result in some competition among nations, as a corporation can form in or
move to another country to take advantage of its laws no matter where it

199. See Roberta S. Karmel, The Securities and Exchange Commission Goes Abroad to

Regulate Corporate Governance, 33 Stetson L. Rev. 849, 856-57, 886 (2004) (discussing the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act's impact on foreign companies).
200. See discussion infra Part II.C.1.
201. See discussion infra Part II.C.2.

202. See infra notes 203-36 and accompanying text.
203. Cox, supra note 4, at 1229.
204. Id. at 1229-31; Gevurtz, supra note 197, at 7 (describing Professor Choi's market
approach to global regulation).
205. See Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1453 (1997)

(arguing for the adoption of an exchange-based system); see also Cox, supra note 4, at 1230.
206. Fox, supra note 37, at 2582.
207. Id. at 2618.
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engages in securities transactions. 20 8 However, competition would be
limited, as there are many factors which influence a corporation when it
decides to incorporate under the laws of a particular country or move its
base of operations there. 209 Territorial approaches, such as issuernationality, would bind the choice of securities regime to the choices based
on these other factors. 2 10 Similarly, and also acting to limit regulatory
competition, these other considerations (and also the cost of relocating) may
work to keep a corporation from selecting a more 211
satisfactory securities
regime, as it would have to relocate to another nation.
Issuer-nationality is based on the idea that competition would be useful,
but to avoid a race to the bottom competition must be limited. 2 12 Advocates
of this theory fear is that countries will compete to make their regime the
most lenient until investor protection is minimal. 2 13 The basic premise is
that where corporations have a choice, that choice will be abused. 2 14 This
theory is not new to the law; a debate between race to the bottom and race
to the top theorists emerged in the domestic context over the choice
2 15
corporations have over which state's corporate governance laws apply.
Adopting a version of this race to the bottom theory, Professor Fox
argues that issuers will choose the regime where the benefits of disclosure
come closest to equaling its costs, a point which he terms a corporation's
"privately optimal level of disclosure." 2 16 This level will always be below
the "socially optimal level of disclosure." 2 17 As political pressure mounts
for a country to lower its levels of investor protection, other countries will
208. See Cox, supra note 4, at 1230-32; see also Fox, supra note 38, at 730-65 (arguing
the superiority of the issuer-nationality approach over other approaches).
209. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 28, at 918 (noting the capital located in a country as
one factor); see also infra notes 301-03 and accompanying text (noting other reasons why
issuer-nationality would not result in pure competition).
210. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 28, at 918.
211. See id.
212. See Fox, supra note 38, at 747-54, 768-82; Fox, supra note 37, at 2503 n.5. This
theory suggests that, given unhindered regulatory competition, corporations will choose to
be governed by the securities regime with the weakest investor protections. See Gevurtz,
supra note 197, at 7; see also supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text (discussing this
theory and its assumptions).
213. See Romano, supra note 129, at 2426-27.
214. See Choi, supra note 5, at 111.
215. For a brief discussion of the history of these competing theories in this corporate
governance context, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The
Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1435, 1444-46
(1992). For the classic formulation of the race to the bottom theory in this context, see
William Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 Yale L.J.
663 (1974). For a response, arguing a race to the top theory, see Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State
Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. Legal Stud. 251
(1977).
216. Fox, supra note 38, at 747.
217. Id. For a discussion of how this will harm the interests of the United States, see id.
at 753-54.
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scramble to do the same in what Fox sees as a perfect example of the old
,"prisoner's dilemma" problem; a country "loses" by weakening its rules,
21 8
but stands to lose more if it does not.
2. Free-Market Approaches
The other two market approaches, free-market approaches, are based on
the domestic policy that a corporation may choose to incorporate under the
laws of any state, even if it has no other connection with that state, and be
regulated by that state's corporate governance laws. 2 19 Professor Roberta
Romano's approach is primarily intended to apply within the United States,
and would allow each state to develop its own securities laws to compete
with each other; a corporation would be subject to the securities laws of the
state in which it has been incorporated. 220 Foreign corporations trading in
the United States would be able to choose their own "securities domicile"
and be subject to its disclosure requirements. 22 1 The underlying premise is
that investors will require higher returns when a corporation is governed by
securities laws which protect their interests less, inducing firms to choose
222
more protective securities regimes, in order to reduce the cost of capital.
The other free-market approach is strikingly similar, and is advocated by
two influential securities law scholars, Professors Stephen Choi and
Andrew Guzman. 2 23 Choi and Guzman have variously termed this
225
approach "portable reciprocity" 224 and the "issuer choice" system.
2
26
Under portable reciprocity, as under Romano's approach,
a corporation
may choose which securities laws would govern all aspects of both the
issuance and trading of its securities. 227 A corporation may even choose to
have its disclosure and other obligations governed by private contract,
2 28
avoiding regulation by any nation's securities laws.
There are only two major practical differences between Romano's
approach and portable reciprocity. 229 First, while Romano mainly focuses
on domestic concerns and argues that each state should develop its own

218. Id. at 784-85.
219. Gevurtz, supra note 197, at 7. This principle only encompasses corporate
governance laws, not disclosure obligations under the securities laws, although one approach
would remove this distinction even within the United States. See infra notes 220-22 and
accompanying text (detailing this approach).
220. Romano, supra note 129 (arguing for regulatory competition between the fifty
states).
221. Id. at 2420.
222. ld. at2418.
223. Gevurtz, supra note 197, at 7.
224. Choi & Guzman, supra note 28, at 907.
225. Choi, supra note 5, at 113. This Note will adhere to the original "portable
reciprocity" phraseology.
226. See supra notes 220-22 and accompanying text (describing Romano's approach).
227. Choi & Guzman, supra note 28, at 918, 922.
228. Id. at 907.
229. See id. at 947-48.
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securities laws, 230 Choi and Guzman have a more global concern and seem
content to allow domestic securities regulation to be left primarily to the
Second, under
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). 23 !
Romano's approach, a corporation is governed by the securities laws of its
state of incorporation, even though there are many other factors a
corporation must weigh when choosing where to incorporate; Choi and
Guzman completely232separate the choice of a securities regime from any
other consideration.
In addition to these practical differences, Choi and Guzman disagree with
Romano over the ramifications of a free-market system. Romano seems to
believe that, in order to reduce the cost of obtaining capital, corporations
will prefer regimes under which investors are highly protected. 2 33 Choi and
Guzman believe that portable reciprocity will simply bring more
diversification:
Some countries may cater to high quality issuers, supplying strong
antifraud protections and requiring significant disclosure. Other countries
may cater to lower quality issuers, providing a quick and relatively
inexpensive means to raise capital. As countries seek to establish a niche
for themselves in the international competition for securities issues, a
spectrum of regulations may emerge. Investors, in turn, will discount the
based on the regime under
price they are willing to pay for securities
234
which the securities are issued or traded.

Some investors, fearful of fraud, will choose to pay higher prices for
protection, while other investors may prefer less stringent requirements, in
order to see a higher rate of return (not only from the lower price of the
securities, but also from the decreased administration costs of a corporation
not subject to strict disclosure requirements). 2 35 Investors and issuers are
not all identical, so having diverse regulatory regimes will help meet their
236
diverse needs.
Stringent securities regulation could benefit corporations, as investors
will be willing to pay more for protection from fraud, raising the price of a
corporation's securities. 2 37 As Professor James Cox has stated, "Weak

230. See supra notes 220-21 and accompanying text.
231. Choi & Guzman, supra note 28, at 944-45.
232. Id. at 948. Under Choi and Guzman's approach, this decision can also be changed
more easily, without having to go through the process of reincorporating in another state. Id.
233. See supra note 222 and accompanying text (explaining why this will be so).
234. Choi & Guzman, supra note 28, at 906.
235. Id. at 916-17.
236. Id. This would also give American corporations the ability to no longer be at a
competitive disadvantage due to the stringent nature of the United States securities laws, if
their interests would be better served under another nation's laws. Id. at 924; see also supra
note 197 (describing how, until recently, the United States securities laws were seen as the
most demanding in the world).
237. Choi & Guzman, supra note 28, at 916.
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regulation heightens the riskiness of investing with the effect that both highquality companies and investors will steer their activities away from the
shoals of any Barbary Coast and toward markets where they can more
' 238
reliably and economically chart their courses to raise funds or invest.
Thus, no "self-respecting country" will want to establish weak
239
regulations.
Evidence exists to support these claims. Some studies have shown that a
portion of foreign companies do, in fact, choose to conduct business in
United States markets because of the high levels of protection for
investors. 240 Some firms may even choose to reveal more than required
under their selected securities regime. 24 1 For example, there is evidence
that many firms trading on the London Stock Exchange already voluntarily
disclose more information than the law requires to reduce the cost of raising
24 2
capital.
However, greater disclosure is not always desirable, not only for
corporations but also for investors and economies. 243 Anything that harms
a corporation indirectly harms its investors, and greater disclosure entails
greater operational costs. 244 There are also "interfirm" costs, such as the
use of the disclosed information "by competitors, major suppliers, or major
customers" to the detriment of the corporation. 245 The economy as a whole
is harmed by greater operational costs to corporations, and also by the
reduction of "the rewards for developing knowledge that identifies new
markets and new products in any area unprotected by patents or copyrights.
[Greater disclosure] in essence reduces the scope of what is considered
246
proprietary information."
3. Criticisms of Free-Market Approaches
Advocates of free-market approaches have endured criticism from
proponents of the race to the bottom theory. 24 7 In response, the free market
scholars argue that this theory does not take accurate account of the
incentives competition would create. 24 8
In the domestic context,
competition among states in corporate law has, "for the most part,
249
maximize[d] share value," benefiting corporations and investors alike.
Proponents of a free-market approach to global securities regulation argue
that there will be a "replay of the market force arguments which have
238. Cox, supra note 4, at 1200.

239. Id.
240. Choi, supra note 5, at 118 & n.34; see also Romano, supra note 129, at 2419-20.

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Romano, supra note 129, at 2421.
Id. at 2426-27.
See Fox, supra note 37, at 2550-52.
Id. at 2550.
Id. at 2550-5 1.
Id. at 2551-52.
See supra notes 212-18 and accompanying text.
See Choi & Guzman, supra note 28, at 949-50; Romano, supra note 129, at 2426-27.
Romano, supra note 129, at 2361.
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triumphed in dealing with corporate governance laws-specifically, that
investors will discount the price of stock to take into account less legal
protections, thereby deterring the selection of inefficient regulatory
as seems
regimes." 25 0 It is hoped that shareholder value will be maximized, 251
to have occurred domestically in the corporate governance context.
The fact that some regulatory competition already exists also harms the
argument that a race to the bottom would develop. 252 By transacting
business within a nation, a corporation can often obtain the benefit of its
securities laws. 253 However, in the current system, as jurisdiction is tied to
territoriality instead of choice, this competition has resulted in the waste of
resources. 254 Self-interested regulators concerned with the size of their
agency, the scope of their authority, and the resulting prestige battle each
may even block
other over jurisdiction, reaching across borders, and 255
corporations and investors from leaving their jurisdiction.
Perhaps the biggest challenge facing the free-market approaches is the
increased wariness of corporate choice in general in the post-Enron
world.25 6 If corporations such as Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco have abused
the choices already given them, with disastrous consequences, it becomes
more difficult to argue that they should be given choice over which
disclosure and antifraud rules should be applied to them. 257 However, it
that the free
may be that Enron has actually strengthened the argument
258
market should take a larger role in securities regulation.
The recent scandals may have helped the argument for regulatory
competition by showing the "fallibility of the U.S. securities laws-which,
until recently, have been held up as probably the most demanding in the
the corporate and securities laws of the United States
world. '259 By 2001, '260
"seemed triumphant.
Enron and the other scandals quickly deflated this

250. Gevurtz, supra note 197, at 7.

251. See supra note 249 and accompanying text (stating that this occurred in the domestic
context).
252. Choi, supra note 5, at 112-13.
253. Id. at 112.
254. Id. at 112-13.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 111-12.
257. Id.; Gevurtz, supra note 197, at 7.
258. In this context, it is important to note that, as egregious as the Enron-related abuses
were, the market acted to correct these problems somewhat, such as by reducing the value
and business of Arthur Anderson. Gevurtz, supra note 197, at 7 n.35.
259. Id. at 8.
260. Id. at 6; see also Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for

CorporateLaw, 89 Geo. L.J. 439 (2001) (arguing the inevitability of the corporate law of the
United States being copied by the global community).
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view. 26 1 Forcing the American securities
laws to become competitive,
2 62
however, could remedy these deficiencies.
While there are, of course, existing incentives for the SEC to improve its
regulations, there are also "a number of perverse incentives" to regulate
without regard to investors or corporations. 263 As Professor Choi argues,
"Leaving regulators with monopoly jurisdiction over issuers and investors
may simply give regulators large latitude to expropriate value for
themselves at the expense of investors." 264 For instance, regulators may act
with an eye toward increasing their size and importance (and possibly their
salaries); Choi finds evidence for this in the growing number and
complexity of SEC regulations. 26 5 Choi also argues that "regulators may
tailor regulations to favor particular industry groups at the expense of
dispersed investors out of a hope of obtaining a job within the industry once
they leave the SEC.

' 266

Competition would alleviate these problems, as

regulators would be forced to craft rules designed to maximize the wealth of
267
corporations and shareholders.
These same incentives lead regulators to waste resources in attempts to
assert and expand their authority and jurisdiction. 2 68 Thus, current
regulatory competition is over regulatory agencies seizing authority from
one another, not over better investor protection. 269 A system styled after
portable reciprocity would eliminate these jurisdictional disputes, as
270
jurisdiction would be a settled issue before a transaction even occurs.
Choi has also pointed to a number of "behavioral biases" clouding the
judgment of well-meaning regulators, problems which could be alleviated
with competition. 271 These include the overconfidence of regulators in
their own expertise, "tunnel vision-like view[s]" leading to application of
the same solution to multiple problems, systemic misinterpretation, and
overreaction. 272 These biases are perpetuated by the fact that the SEC does
not have to compete with other regulators, so problems go unnoticed and
27 3
unfixed.

261. Gevurtz, supra note 197, at 6-7; see also id. at 2 (noting the need for restraint in
making the assumption that one's corporate and securities laws are superior and must be
exported).
262. Choi, supra note 5, at 111-12.
263. See id. at 112.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 112-13. Increased regulation does not automatically equal increased investor
protection. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 28, at 942.
266. Choi, supra note 5, at 113.
267. Id. at 113-14.
268. Id. at 112-13.
269. Id. at 116.
270. See supra note 227 and accompanying text (noting this aspect of portable
reciprocity).
271. Choi, supra note 5, at 117-18.
272. Id.
273. See id.
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III. ADOPTING A LIMITED FORM OF COMPETITIVE REGULATION WILL
SOLVE THE JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE

The current formulations that courts use to determine jurisdiction 274 are
too problematic to remain unchanged. A circuit split with ambiguous
standards 2 75 makes it very difficult for foreign corporations to be placed on
2 76
notice of when they may be subject to the antifraud provisions of the Act.
Inefficiency also results, as corporations are forced to comply with multiple
securities regimes and disclosure standards.277
To a certain extent, any assertion of jurisdiction over a foreign
transaction may be undesirable. Congress has not explicitly provided for
extraterritorial application of the Act.2 78 Many courts and commentators
279
have thus seen any assertion of jurisdiction as improper judicial activism.
Furthermore, concerns of international comity are implicated whenever a
court applies the securities laws of the United States to a foreign
transaction. 280 Besides, the bulky jurisdictional issue wastes the resources
of the parties. 28 1 Many corporations may even forego doing business in the
United States to avoid any possibility of having to comply with the strict
282
federal securities laws.
However, it is also true that, even with all of the attendant problems, at
least some exercise of jurisdiction meets important policy needs; even the
more restrictive courts have called this notion elementary. 283 Extension of
jurisdiction often serves the broad scope and remedial purposes of the

274. See discussion supra Part I.B (describing the tests the courts employ, the difficulty
of defining and classifying those tests, and the many problems inherent in those tests).
275. See supra notes 81-89 and accompanying text (describing the basic circuit split and
the difficulty of defining the various rules in relation to one another).
276. See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
277. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text. The ordinary canon of construction
provides that, unless Congress has explicitly indicated otherwise, an act is only meant to
apply domestically. See discussion supra Part I.A.3; see also supra notes 170-72 and
accompanying text (describing how some courts have relied on this canon when denying
jurisdiction).
279. See supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 179-83 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 185-95 and accompanying text.
282. See Romano, supra note 129, at 2419 ("The principal reason that the vast majority of
non-U.S. firms who could qualify for exchange trading do not list in the United States is that
their disclosure costs would significantly increase, particularly with respect to accounting
data, as they would have to comply with the SEC's regime."); supra notes 196-99 and
accompanying text (noting this argument and supporting evidence); see also Choi &
Guzman, supra note 28, at 924 & n.75 (stating that the extensive disclosure mandated by the
United States securities laws puts firms complying with those laws at a disadvantage).
283. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text (noting how even the Second Circuit
recognizes that at least some extraterritorial application is required); see also supra notes
158-60 and accompanying text (describing the important role of policy).
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Act. 284

Perhaps the best argument for jurisdiction is that fraudulent conduct
285
occurring within the United States should not go unpunished.
While it is elementary that exercising jurisdiction is an effective way to
meet these needs, it is not the only way to do so. Adopting a more
competitive global securities regime, with some limitations, will address
many of the concerns of those who support jurisdiction, 2 86 alleviate many
of the fears of those who argue against such jurisdiction, 287 and eliminate
the problems associated with the current formulations of when
extraterritorial jurisdiction is allowable. 28 8 At the same time, this market
approach will stimulate competition among nations to craft securities laws
289
that better serve the interests of both corporations and investors.
This part addresses how this solution will work, and how it should be
styled. Part lI.A begins by arguing that a free-market approach should be
adopted, as a territorial-market approach would result in less competition.
Specifically, a "portable reciprocity" free-market approach is advocated
over Professor Romano's free-market approach. 290 Part II.A.3 criticizes
the race to the bottom, a theory used to support limitations on competition.
Lastly, Part III.A.4 draws support for this system from the failures of Enron
and similar scandals. Part III.B then examines how that system should be
designed. 29 1 The remainder of Part H explains how this system will
resolve many of the difficulties inherent in the current judicial tests while
292
addressing most of the concerns on both sides of the debate.
A. A Free-MarketApproach, Styled After PortableReciprocity, Is Superior
to a Territorial-MarketApproach
1. Territorial-Market Approaches Limit Potential Competition
Both free-market 293 and territorial-market 294 approaches have much to
commend them, but a free-market approach would stimulate more

284. See
285. See
widespread
286. See

supra notes 138-40, 143-48 and accompanying text.
supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text (detailing this argument and its
support).
discussion supra Part II.A (describing such concerns).

287. See discussion supra Part 1I.B (describing such fears).

288. See discussion supra Part I.B.2 (detailing many of these problems).
289. See discussion infra Part III.A.
290. See discussion infra Part III.A.2.

291. Perhaps the most important feature of this system would be the limitation of its
operation to certain countries, designed to prevent corporations from choosing relatively
weak securities laws. See infra notes 339-40 and accompanying text.
292. See discussion infra Part IJI.C.
293. See supra notes 219-36 and accompanying text (describing portable reciprocity and
Professor Romano's approach).
294. See supra notes 205-08 and accompanying text (describing issuer-nationality and
exchange-based systems).
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competition. 29 5 While the exchange-based approach used in most other
Western countries would give greater incentives for stock exchanges to
craft better regulations concerning disclosure, there are far too many other
considerations affecting a corporation's choice of exchange, such as its
location and rules, as well as the capital market this would allow the
corporation to access. 29 6 Furthermore, competition among exchanges
across national boundaries is minimal; exchanges do not regulate investors,
and exchanges cannot provide for criminal (and even some civil)
297
enforcement.
The other territorial approach, the issuer-nationality system, relies on the
29 8
actual domicile of a corporation to provide for its securities regulation.
While this method would stimulate some competition among nations, it
299
suffers from some of the same problems of an exchange-based system.
There are many reasons why a corporation may have its economic center of
gravity in any given country, so concerns over securities laws would be
inseparably bound to these many other concerns. 30 0
This reduced
competition would result in fewer incentives for countries to develop
securities laws, and Professors Choi and Guzman believe it will also lead to
overregulation. 30 1 Issuer-nationality may hinder capital mobility across
borders, and would prevent a corporation with high-quality securities
located in a country with low-quality protection from choosing to be
regulated by a securities regime more appropriate to its circumstances; this
would also hinder efficient pricing of that security. 302 A territorial
approach would thus "fail to maximize the potential benefits from
regulatory competition." 30 3 A theory based on territoriality is also
becoming "increasingly anachronistic given the fluid international nature of
most capital markets." 30 4 A new approach, designed to accommodate the
modern nature of international capital mobility, should not be fashioned off
of national borders, given their dwindling importance in the financial
305
community.
295. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 28, at 946 (noting the difficulties regarding
effective competition between exchanges).
296. See supra note 205 and accompanying text (explaining the exchange-based system).
297. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 28, at 946-47.
298. See supra notes 206-08 and accompanying text (explaining the issuer-nationality
approach).
299. See supra notes 295-97 and accompanying text (describing these exchange-based
problems).
300. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 28, at 918 (noting the capital located in a country as
one factor); cf supra note 296 and accompanying text (discussing how the same would be
true in an exchange-based system).
301. Choi & Guzman, supra note 28, at 949-50.
302. See id. at 949.
303. Id. at 914.
304. Id. at 918.
305. See id.
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2. Portable Reciprocity Would Stimulate Greater Competition than
Professor Romano's Approach
Portable reciprocity 30 6 and Professor Romano's approach 30 7 are
strikingly similar, but portable reciprocity would create greater
competition. 30 8 This results because under Romano's approach, United
States corporations would be subject to the securities laws of their state of
incorporation. 30 9 Portable reciprocity, on the other hand, separates the
choice of securities regime from any other consideration, such as the capital
located within a jurisdiction. 3 10 Some corporations may choose to issue
their securities within a country in order to gain access to that country's
capital, even if the securities laws of that country are "suboptimal. ' '3 11 This
also creates less incentive for larger markets, such as the United States, to
develop their 12securities laws, as their capital is too important to many
3
corporations.
3. Critique of the Race to the Bottom Theory
The race to the bottom theory is often used to justify the issuernationality approach and its inherent limitations on competition, 313 but this
theory fails to account for the evidence 3 14 and has not produced real results.
Domestically, the competition which the original proponents of the race to
the bottom theory feared actually raised shareholder value, benefiting both
corporations and their constituents. 3 15 There are strong arguments that the
same would occur in an international context. 3 16 Furthermore, the limited
global competition that already exists has not produced a race to the bottom,
but wasteful jurisdictional battles instead. 3 17 The binding of jurisdiction to
territory instead of choice has led to regulators attempting to reach across
borders and prevent the flight of investors. 3 18 if corporations were allowed
choice of securities regime with no other considerations which regulators
could use as leverage against them, then the productive forces of
306. See supra notes 223-28 and accompanying text (describing portable reciprocity).
307. See supra notes 220-22 and accompanying text (describing Romano's system).
308. See supra note 232 and accompanying text (explaining how portable reciprocity,
unlike Romano's approach, completely isolates the choice of securities regime from other
concerns).
309. See supra note 220 and accompanying text (noting this aspect of Romano's
approach). So, corporations will not make the choice of which securities regime to adopt by
itself, but in conjunction with the many other choices a corporation must make when
deciding where to be incorporated. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 28, at 918.
310. Choi & Guzman, supra note 28, at 918.
311. Id. at 919.
312. Id.

313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

See supra notes 212-18 and accompanying text.
Romano, supra note 129, at 2383-84.
See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 252-55 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 254-55 and accompanying text.
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competition could be harnessed as regulators could vie for jurisdiction
solely through the offering of more efficient regulations.
It is not necessary for a race to the top to exist to discredit the race to the
3 19
bottom theory. It may be true that competition merely creates diversity.
In the global securities regulation context, some nations may offer weak
regulations, while others may offer strong ones, and investors will value the
price of stock accordingly. 320 The market should be able to efficiently
value the various securities regimes, especially considering that
unsophisticated investors are being diluted proportionally by institutional
investors. 32 1 Many corporations will choose to be governed by stricter
securities laws, in order to instill investor confidence and reduce the cost of
raising capital. 3 22 Other corporations may choose laxer securities regimes
to avoid excessive operational and interfirm costs. 323 Many corporations
are currently harmed by securities regimes not tailored to their particular
needs, as are their investors, and so corporations should be given some
choice in the matter.
4. The Challenge of Enron
The fallibility of the United States securities regime that Enron
demonstrated 324 leads to two important conclusions. The first is that courts
should be more wary when determining that United States securities laws
must be asserted extraterritorially to better protect foreign investors and
punish fraudulent conduct. 325 Post-Enron, it is more difficult to claim that
United States law can accomplish investor protection better than the law of
the jurisdiction with a greater interest in and connection to the underlying
claims. 326 The second conclusion is that the securities regime of the United
States could benefit from the incentives to improve that competition would
bring.

32 7

Instead of detracting from the argument for a free-market approach, the
Enron scandals serve to highlight its need. "[S]ecurities regulations.., are
often flawed because of the inevitable foibles of those who promulgate and

319. See supra notes 234-36 and accompanying text (explaining the argument that

regulatory competition will create neither a race to the bottom or the top, just diverse
regimes to meet diverse needs).
320. See Cox, supra note 4, at 1201; Romano, supra note 129, at 2421.
321. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 28, at 926 n.80, 942.
322. See supra notes 237-42 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 243-46 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 256-73 and accompanying text.
325. See discussion supra Part II.A (presenting arguments courts and commentators use
to support the exercise of jurisdiction).

326. See Gevurtz, supra note 197, at 8.
327. See supra note 233 and accompanying text (describing Romano's belief that
corporations will choose the securities regimes that best serve investors).
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enforce them," 328 and currently, those regulators face no competition and so
lack the incentives for constant improvement that such competition would
bring. If these scandals have shown that United States securities laws are
not perfect, then they have also shown the need for restraint when forcing
329
them upon completely foreign transactions.
B. How a Competitive Global Securities Regime Should be Structured
In order to generate meaningful competition while still ensuring investor
protection, many basic needs must be met. The first is that the choice
between securities regimes should be unhindered by other considerations,
so that larger markets, which corporations need for access to capital, will
still face strong incentives to craft better securities laws. 330 Corporations
331
must thus possess the ability to choose any securities regime they wish,
332
subject to important limitations discussed below.
Of course, for this system to work, corporations must be required to
clearly disclose which regime they have chosen. 333 Otherwise, the
securities will not be valued efficiently, and one of the major premises of
portable reciprocity-that investors will discount the price of stock in
corporations shielded by weaker investor protection-will vanish. 334 This
would, in fact, lead to a race to the bottom, as securities will not be valued
lower if a corporation chooses weaker investor protections, so corporations
335
would have little reason to avoid weaker regimes.
The application of a global competitive regime should be limited to
disclosure requirements, antifraud rules, and other aspects of the laws
directly relevant thereto. 336 Many aspects of the Act, as well as the
Securities Act of 1933 and other federal securities laws, overlap with
corporate governance laws and even bankruptcy laws. 337 Thus, including
many other provisions of securities laws in a competitive regime would
unnecessarily complicate matters and cause considerable international
confusion. When defining "securities laws" for the purpose of such a

328. Gevurtz, supra note 197, at 8.

329. Id.
330. See supra notes 298-303, 310-12 and accompanying text (describing why isolation
of this choice from other concerns maximizes competition).
331. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 28, at 917.
332. See infra notes 339-45 and accompanying text (describing how this regime should be
limited to countries with sufficient investor protections).
333. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 28, at 926 (detailing how regulators may fashion
such disclosure requirements).
334. See supra notes 222, 233-36 and accompanying text (describing this assumption and
its possible implications).
335. See supra notes 212-15 and accompanying text (describing the race to the bottom
theory).
336. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 28, at 935-36.
337. See, e.g., id. (discussing these overlapping regulations).
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global regime, it would therefore be best to avoid this problem by only
338
including disclosure requirements, antifraud rules, and related provisions.
One of the most important features of such a global regime would be the
limitation of its application to countries with securities laws that contain at
least a moderate level of investor protection. These protections need not be
extraordinary, as some difference between protections offered by various
countries is desirable, 339 but they should be of a level sufficient to ensure
that corporations do not choose a regime in order to purposefully defraud
investors. Portable reciprocity does not provide for such a limited
application, 340 but it is necessary to curb possible abuse.
Even Choi and Guzman readily admit that those who choose laxer
regimes may be doing so purely to engage in activities prohibited by other
securities regimes. 34 1 Furthermore, the discounting process is not perfect
and cannot accurately value every small difference from one securities
regime to another. 342 Thus, not only would limitation of a global regime's
application to countries with at least moderate levels of investor protection
reduce the dangers that errors in the valuation process would produce, but
the overall market will have a smaller spectrum to evaluate. In addition,
allowing a corporation to choose a nation with extremely weak investor
protection seems to disregard the prophylactic purpose of disclosure lawsto deter fraud. 34 3 For all of these reasons, private contract should not be
allowed to substitute for the choice of an actual nation's securities laws, as
Choi and Guzman recommend. 344 Private contract suffers from the
additional problem that it would be difficult to foresee how courts would
345
interpret the contracts' language.
A claim arising from a securities transaction should be adjudicated in the
forum which has promulgated the chosen securities regime.
This
jurisdictional question is a complex problem with no easy solution, but
using, as a default forum, the nation whose laws are at issue is an efficient
solution for a number of reasons. 346 Instead of numerous jurisdictions
across the world interpreting and applying the laws of another jurisdiction
in equally numerous ways, the regime's own courts would have sole control
338. See id.

339. See supra notes 234-36 and accompanying text (noting how different companies
may choose securities regimes suited to their various needs, and investors may choose
different levels of protection, all valued accordingly).
340. See supra notes 224-36 and accompanying text.
341. Choi & Guzman, supra note 28, at 916-17.
342. See Cox, supra note 4, at 1233-34. Professor Cox also notes the harmful impact this
could have on portfolios that are insufficiently diversified among various levels of investor
protection. Id. at 1235.
343. Id. at 1235-36.
344. See supra note 228 and accompanying text (briefly noting how Choi and Guzman
would allow such contractual provisions).
345. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 28, at 940.
346. Id. at 931.
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over the proper interpretation of its jurisdiction's laws. 34 7 Further, this
framework would enable claims to be adjudicated by experts on that
particular nation's law, who also have greater incentives to vigorously
enforce that law. 34 8 Furthermore, if different jurisdictions are applying
another country's securities laws in divergent ways, then the country 349
of
each investor would presumably play a role in the valuation of securities.
This would be undesirable; not only would it make the valuation process
much more complicated and inefficient, 350 but it could deter some
corporations from offering securities to citizens of countries
whose courts
35 1
interpret the chosen law in ways adverse to the corporation.
Although some may argue that this solution poses difficulties for
investors who can pursue their claims only in courts in remote
jurisdictions, 35 2 this problem is minimized for several reasons. First, this is
not a new problem, given the increasingly international nature of the
financial community, and that rapidly improving transportation and
communication have been ameliorating this dilemma. 353 Additionally, the
fact that some investors will have to pursue their claims in remote
jurisdictions will play a role in the valuation of the securities, so investors
will be, in essence, receiving the protection they purchase. 35 4 However,
because of these potential problems, courts should uphold forum selection
clauses in securities transactions that purport to select more convenient
forums; the market for securities will take account of these clauses and
355
value securities accordingly.
Enforcement is a further issue that must be addressed. All nations
involved in the competitive global regime should agree to enforce the
securities claim judgments of other countries within their own jurisdictions.
This way, a corporation may not easily avoid enforcement of any judgments
356
by picking a regime in which it has no assets.
There must also be sufficient incentives for nations to compete with each
other. If the choice of securities regime is completely separate from any
territorial concerns, then a nation would not be competing to attract actual

347. Id. at 930.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 929.
350. Id.

351. Cf id. at 922-23 (discussing how many companies purposefully exclude investors
from the United States in order to avoid the federal securities laws); Testy, supra note 112, at
957-58 (noting the potential for such exclusion).
352. See Romano, supra note 129, at 2422-23 (noting how this would compound the
collective action problem).
353. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 28, at 931; cf Choi, supra note 5, at 113 (noting
that "the growing integration of world financial markets reduces the cost of implementing
such a system of issuer choice").
354. Choi & Guzman, supra note 28, at 931-32.
355. Id. at 928, 931.
356. Id. at 931.
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business and capital to its markets. 357 One possible way to create a
competitive incentive would be to create fees for choosing to operate under
a nation's securities laws. In addition, the same incentives that currently
exist for regulators to assert jurisdiction would work in favor of this
system. 358 Furthermore, a corporation which has chosen a particular
nation's regime
is more likely to issue securities within that nation's
35 9
borders.
In the event that a corporation has not chosen an allowable securities
regime, or is a corporation of a nation not party to the agreement
establishing this global competitive regime, the old conduct and effects tests
should apply. 360 if a foreign corporation operating in the United States is
not from a country included in the global securities regime, it is most likely
36 1
because that nation's securities laws offer weak protections for investors.
These weak laws would implicate many of the concerns of the courts
currently exercising broad jurisdiction over foreign securities
transactions. 362 Thus, a less restrictive form of the conduct test is
appropriate. However, an approach as broad as the Third Circuit's, finding
jurisdiction if any conduct took place within the United States, is judicial
overreaching. 363 Therefore, an intermediate test is appropriate. This test
could be formulated in many ways, such as whether substantial conduct
occurred within the United States, but the most important thing is that it is
clearly formulated. This would help reduce the amount of discretion left to
the judge 364 and give these corporations better notice of what actions will
3 65
subject them to the provisions of the Act.

C. Advantages of the ProposedSystem
The limited form of global securities competition outlined in Part II.B
would resolve many current problems and bring new benefits. One
advantage is that such a system would give regulators incentives "to fashion
357. See supra notes 330-32 and accompanying text (explaining why, in this proposal, the
choice of securities regime must be isolated). But see Choi & Guzman, supra note 28, at
931-32 (discussing some practical reasons why corporations may choose the securities
regime of their own countries, as they would have "home field advantage").
358. See supra notes 263-70 and accompanying text (describing how regulators may
currently assert jurisdiction for self-interested reasons, such as to increase prestige).
359. Choi & Guzman, supra note 28, at 923 (giving reasons why a corporation is more
likely to do so).
360. See discussion supra Part I.B.1 (describing the nature of these tests and how they
have been employed).
361. See supra notes 339-45 and accompanying text (describing how, in this proposal,
weaker regimes would be excluded from the larger global regime).

362. See discussion supra Part II.A (discussing many of these concerns).
363. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (describing this liberal test).
364. See supra note 59 (noting how, currently, judges enjoy considerable discretion).

365. See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text (noting how difficult it is for
corporations to know when they may be subject to United States securities laws).
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regimes designed to maximize the welfare of securities market
participants." 366 This may result in a race to the top as nations compete to
fashion laws more beneficial to investors and corporations alike. 36 7 At the
very least, it will cause nations to craft a diverse set of regulations to better
meet the diverse needs of corporations. 3 68 Limiting its application to
countries with some heightened investor protection would not only seem to
increase the possibility of a race to the top, but would provide incentives for
own securities laws, so that they
the excluded nations to better develop their
369
may be admitted into the global regime.
The resulting competition would bring many advantages. The Enron,
WorldCom, Tyco, and other corporate scandals have highlighted the need
for the securities laws of the United States to be improved through
competition. 370 This competition will be heightened by the severance of the
choice of a securities regime from any other consideration. 37 1 The limited
amount of competition that already exists largely focuses on aggressive
assertion of jurisdiction, and, thus, wastes resources. 372 Competition will
also help bring the incentives of regulators into line with those of investors
and corporations. 37 3 Similarly, behavioral biases of regulators will be kept
374
under better control.
There are other new benefits that this system would bring. For instance,
United States corporations, which have to disclose much more than their
3 75
foreign rivals, will no longer have to be at a competitive disadvantage.
Securities will also be priced more efficiently, as a corporation's chosen
regime will act as a "signal" as to the quality of an offering. 37 6 Another
benefit would be that United States markets would open up to foreign
issuers currently avoiding the United States purposefully because of
stringent federal securities laws; 377 this result would enable United States
investors to purchase these securities without having to go through a foreign

366. Choi & Guzman, supra note 28, at 923.
367. See supra notes 222, 233, 237-42, 321-22 and accompanying text (describing the
race to the top and reasons why it may occur).
368. See supra notes 234-36, 319-21 and accompanying text (describing this
diversification and reasons why it may occur).
369. See supra notes 339-45 and accompanying text (explaining how this proposal would
exclude nations with weak investor protections).
370. See discussion supra Part III.A.4 (explaining why these scandals necessitate this
conclusion).
371. See supra notes 308-12 and accompanying text.
372. See supra notes 252-55 and accompanying text.

373. See supra notes 263-70 and accompanying text (describing how, currently,
regulators may act to the detriment of corporations and shareholders).
374. See supra notes 271-73 and accompanying text.
375. Choi & Guzman, supra note 28, at 924; see also supra notes 28, 236 and
accompanying text.
376. Choi & Guzman, supra note 28, at 924; Romano, supra note 129, at 2421.
377. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 28, at 945; see also supra notes 196-99, 282 and
accompanying text (presenting arguments that some foreign corporations currently
purposefully avoid the United States for fear of its federal securities laws).
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exchange. 37 8 Investors would gain not only from competitive regimes, but
also because such competition would reduce systematic risk (risk inherent
to a particular corporation or its industry) in proportion to unsystematic risk
(risk inherent in the entire market, which cannot be protected against
through diversification), allowing
greater reduction of a portfolio's risk
379
through further diversification.
Problems inherent in the current jurisprudence would also be solved. For
example, a competitive global securities regime would eliminate the current
inefficiency due to a corporation being forced to comply with multiple
securities regimes. 3 80 The problem with multi-compliance is not simply
that a corporation is always forced to comply with the most stringent of the
regimes that applies to it; even the regimes that are generally more lenient
may make demands that the most stringent one does not, so a corporation is,
in essence, complying with something more strict than the strictest of
regimes to which it is subject. 38 1 Furthermore, the confusing circuit split
regarding a conduct test would be eliminated. 382 Of course, corporations
that have chosen an allowable securities regime will always be on notice of
which laws to abide by, no matter where in the world they transact
business. 383 While there will still be no international consensus on what
constitutes fraudulent conduct, this will be much less of a problem, as there
384
will no longer be improper extraterritorial application of securities laws.
International conflict over extensions of jurisdiction will cease to be an
issue. 3 85 Furthermore, as long as the international agreement or other
implementing device so provides, there will be no problem of enforcing a
386
judgment in other jurisdictions subject to the global regime.
Although the United States will still have jurisdiction over many foreign
transactions under this system, the problems pointed out by those who
argue against courts asserting such jurisdiction will be ameliorated. Courts

378. Romano, supra note 129, at 2420. Currently, many companies purposefully exclude
investors from the United States in order to avoid the application of federal securities laws.
Choi & Guzman, supra note 28, at 922-23.
379. Fox, supra note 37, at 2509-12.
380. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
381. Fox, supra note 37, at 2583-84.
382. See supra notes 80-89 and accompanying text (describing the division surrounding
the conduct test and the chaos this has caused).
383. See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text (describing how, currently, it is
exceedingly difficult for many corporations to know when they are subject to the United
States's securities laws).
384. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text (describing this lack of an
international consensus, and how it currently makes extraterritorial application of the Act
problematic).
385. See generally supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
386. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text (describing difficulties enforcing
judgments).
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would be given explicit authority to assert such jurisdiction. 387 There
should thus be no more concern over improper judicial activism. 388 Policy
determinations, such as those involved in the question of whether a
jurisdiction has sufficient investor protection to be party to the agreement,
would be made by diplomatic and legislative bodies much better suited to
such determinations

than courts. 389

Similarly,

international

comity

concerns will no longer be implicated. 3 90 Additionally, as jurisdiction will
cease to be a major issue for litigation when a corporation has chosen an
allowable securities regime, judicial economy will be served and the parties
39 1
will not waste resources on jurisdictional battles.
Many of the interests pointed out by supporters of federal jurisdiction
will also be addressed. The remedial purposes of the Act will be served
where the Act is implicated. 392 Where a corporation has not chosen to be
governed by the Act, investors can still be assured that they are receiving at
least a moderate level of protection, 393 whatever level of protection for
which they pay. 394 As countries with weaker investor protections would
not be part of the regime, fraud would not go unpunished. 395 It can also be
assured that foreign courts will reciprocate and protect American
investors. 396 Corporations from countries with minimal levels of protection
would be subject to a more relaxed version of the conduct test, as well as
the effects test, allowing courts fairly broad discretion with which to protect
investors and deter fraud. 397 This should ensure that, where the policy
concerns of supporters of expansive jurisdiction are implicated, they will be
39 8
addressed.

387. See supra notes 28-34, 167-72 and accompanying text (explaining the lack of
congressional guidance, and how this is used in arguments that jurisdiction should be
limited); see also discussion supra Part I.A.3 (describing the canon of statutory construction
requiring that, unless otherwise provided, a statute only applies domestically).
388. See supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text (describing how some courts have
characterized broad jurisdiction as improper judicial activism).
389. See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text (detailing the concerns of allowing a
court to make such policy determinations).
390. See supra notes 179-83 and accompanying text.
391. See supra notes 185-95 and accompanying text.
392. See supra notes 138-40, 143-48 and accompanying text (describing how supporters
of liberal jurisdiction have relied on the broad scope and remedial purposes of the Act).
393. See supra notes 339-45 and accompanying text (explaining how this proposal
excludes nations with weak investor protections).
394. See supra notes 234-36 and accompanying text (noting how investors would value
various securities regimes differently).
395. See supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text (noting how many have argued that
jurisdiction should be exercised to prevent corporations from engaging in fraudulent
activities within the United States).
396. See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
397. See supra notes 360-65 and accompanying text (explaining how, if this were the
case, courts should employ fairly liberal forms of the conduct and effects tests).
398. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text (noting the general policy concerns
of those who support broad jurisdiction).
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CONCLUSION

The jurisprudence regarding jurisdiction over largely foreign securities
transactions is highly problematic. 399 The confusion it has produced has
ensured that corporations often cannot reasonably know when they may
have to comply with strict federal securities laws. 400 This has led to
inefficiency and chaos. 40 ' Introducing regulatory competition on a global
scale, while it will not be easy to implement, has a number of advantages
over any other possible solution. 402 Not only will it solve the jurisdictional
problem, but it will do so while addressing the concerns of courts and
commentators on both sides of the debate.40 3 Additionally, it will bring
new benefits to the global market.404 It will certainly bring greater
efficiency and diversity, and it may even produce a desirable race to the
40 5
top.
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